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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The study of industrial controversy hi both interesting and necessary·interesting, because of the dynamic display of conflicting views generated by
the contending parties; necessary, because 1) it provides a barometer by
which to judge the challging times in industrial relations and Z) it serves as a
basts for deeidina whether another type of arrangement. other than our present system. of "free" collective bargaiaing. is better and enables us to analyz
carefully proposed schemes that would force acceptance and ripdity through
third party intervention in. labor-management relations.
The argument that the U. S. has retained its existing system without
con.ieledng alternatives is peculiarly out of step with most American views.
As a nation, we oppose intervention in Konomic Ufe.

We pride ourselves on

the ability to resolve labor -:maD&,ement difference. and direct them into
channela favorable to the continuance of present arrangements.

When the

parties to con.traet negotiations meet an impass of such important that the
controvel'sy disrupts pl'oduetion in a major American industl'Y, the question
invariably arises: Does controvel'sy preclude agreement?

A. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:

A great controversy bas arisen in recent years over the relationship
of wages and prices and. the relative effect of change in each on our national

economy.

The fact that the economy had been in a slump in 1957-1958 cre-

ated an increased interest in the investigation of the wage-price controversy_

There are those VJ'ho argue that wages a.re too hJ.gh and that
them has caused a "cost push" t:nfiationary spiral.

incr~asing

The rise in prices, it has

been argued by others, has forced the consumer to curtail purchasing, thus
decreasing effective demands.

Still others have charged that both wages and

prices are exorbitant and have placed an und.ue burden on the economy, espedally du.ring the recession.

One of. the most intense wage-price controversies has concerned the
steel industry.

The pressure to defend its position in the contract negotia-

tions permeated the arauments from both labor and management.

Manage.

ment and labor in the steel industry had been aglress!ve in attempts to bolster
its poSition and contentions in this wage ...price discussion.

This bad been

true in the past. but the 1959 contract negotiations heightened the contest.

This thesis is designed. to study the contend.ing views of management
and labor in the steel industry during the 1959 contract ne,otiations.

B.

PROBLEMS FACED IN STUDYING THE STEEL CONTROVERSY:
A lew thin,. should be made explicit Wore entering upon an examina-

tion of the areas ol disagreement in the recent st.el controversy.

First, in

the following discussion the author cannot describe the arguments in full

detail; if he did, he would confuse issues rather than illuminate them.

And

still the problern r.o.ust not be overgeneralizad to the point where the reader
loses confidence and becom.es enlaged in mere speculation.

Hence. to solve

this problem the writer has used his own per sonal judgment in analyzing what
he considered to be the main areas of controversy.

Attempts have been made

to summarize accurately most specific material presented by each party.

Second. persons studying the controversy ill the steel industry must
recognize the highly err.l.otional nature of the argumentation by both labor and
lllanagement.

Both parties had high stakes in the 1959 nel0tiations.

Vlithin

the framework of the analysis. the writer has tried to ride the work of emo-

tionalism, and. still account for the fine nuances of thought which were ejected
into the particular arguments.

In dealing with matters unusually susceptible

to emotional coloration, for the writer to assume that this study is totally
immunized from all environmental influence. is both illogical and capricious.

Third, the greatest difficulty, perhaps, in the study of the steel con ...
troversy is to be found in the reader's own prejudices and pre-conceptions.
People are influenced by their status and role and many time. are overly concerned with their biases.

Such and attitude inhibits a dispassionate study of

the delicate area of c:ontrover sy.

Fourth, controversy of it. very na.ture 18 dynamic.

It is constantly

4
being modified by circumstances of the times often beyond the control of either
labor or management.

Wha.t might have been essential to the parties at the

time of this dispute, might seem irrelevant in a future time.

Then too, new

conditions might totally invalidate conclusions drawn from the present controversy.

Technological changes or better understanding of the nature of contro-

versy itself can eradicate some of the areas of dispute.

Fifth, the controversy was heightened by political overtones.

While

some suggest this to be of paramount importance in the final settlement, the
reader will notice this completely omitted from the writer's consideration.
To explore the area would necessitate further investigation out of the scope
of the pres ent wo rk.

Sixth, the recency of the controversy has not permitted the publication
of any complete analysis.

The absence of such material has forced the

writer to rely upon his own.

C.

METHOD FOR

TRSATML2~T

OF THE PROBLEM:

The writer has oelected two areas of controversy in the steel negotiations for detailed study.

The problem of the wage issue forms the subject

of Chapter II. while Chapter III deals with the work rUles issue.

The wage

issue is further clarified by discussions on productivity, inflation, and foreign
competition.

In addition to the debate on work rules in which the parties

5
en.~aged,

the writer has selected a num.ber of decisions rendered by arbitra ...
st~el

tors involving wort>; rulez &rievan.ces in the

d.ed. bl the general discussion of Chapter
.ua .........work

ru1es~

m.

industry.

These are inclu ...

and appear after ea¢h of the 111-

scheduling and hours of work, and wUdea.t strikes.

TUlle cases were

s~l.cted

at random 'by the author from among ma.ny

cases representing varying phases of the work rules controversy.
simUarity amonG them

i~j

that they

involv~

The only

a majol' sted producel' and the

C'r.Jted Steelworkers of A.medca or other unions whleh were bargaining

a.gents for wOl'ke%'s in the basie steel industry or their subdivisions.

In pre ••nting the ease., the author has lu.mmal'ized both the major
baeklrO'tUld details of the grievance and the cled SiOA of the arbitrator.

D.

M.ATEIlIALS USED:

pampldet., leUer., and display "vent.emuts prbtte4 'tty th.e St.el Compa ..
Di•• ' Coordinating Committe., iadf:vidul .teel firms, or by the U'Zlited St••l ..

workere of America pull11c re1atieaa departm.at.

Ext••aiv.

'G'. i$ alao mad

Press.
The writer haa a180 foun4 a1Na4aDt ",e of the Seute Su'beommitte.
b.earb~la Oll

-

MmlDietered. Pric •• • ..Ste.l heac:led by Senator E.tes Kefauver.

The August publication 01. 13aekgl'ound Statistics by l..abor Secretary James P.
!,litchell and other Departmeat of labor pubUcaUon:9 have proved..l.nvaluable

to the writ....

1
CHAPTER
THE

WAGE

II
ISSUE

The wage issue received much publicity in pre-negotiation statements
and early sessions of actual meetings between management and union bargaining teams.

However, as negotiations progressed, the actual wage issue,

while continuing to be aired in public statements, was relegated to a secondary
position by the insistance of management that any talk of increases would have
to be viewed in relation to other issues.

A.

MANAGEMENT, WORKER, AND THE PUBLIC:
Arguments by both union and management in the wage controversy had

been supplied to the general public through their paid advertisements in the
daily newspapers, circular letters, and debates by leading officials on television.

Each decided to try its case in public.

The war of press releases and

display advertisements continued apace with the negotiations at the Roosevelt
Hotel in New York City.
the die was cast.

Since both sides embarked on a public campaign,

In the "cold war" steel management insisted publicly and

privately that they meant what they said about "holding the line."

Steel

labor found itself playing a dual role of both offense and defense, insisting
that management claims were "phony" ilsuea.
Steel industry ads attempting to make "inflationll into a key issue in
the steel dispute appeared in 430 newspapers.

Retaliating, the Union took

8

full-page displays depicting industry leaders piling up Iffantastic profits. " 1
1. Union Determination--Need for

~

Wage Increase:

The Union posi-

tion had been set when delegates to the September 1958 Ninth Constitutional
Convention of the United Steelworkers of America in Atlantic City, New Jers.e}
made it clear that they were determined to march foreward in the next series
of collective bargaining nesotiations in steel and allied industries.

The con-

venti on set the stage for future meetings of the 171 member International
Wage Policy Committee (W PC) to draw up formal demands to the bargaining tables.

The 3,500 cOllvention delegates called upon the W PC to adopt a

foreward looking 1959 wage policy designed to provide future protection and
improvements for their membership--both those employed and those suffering
the hardships of unemployment.
At the same time the delegates were also determined that there would
be no "turninS back the clock" as the Union moved into the period of crucial
negotiations.

"We will be

re~dy

to conclude fair and reasonable agreements.

'Ne will ask for no more and we will accept no less" Z declared David J. Mc
Donald, International President US W at the convention.

1.

These ads placed through the Robert Wiltman Company of Pittsburgh cost the Union an estimated $1 million. "Labor Polishes its Image, "
Fortune, Vol. LXI, No.1, (January. 1960), p. 179.
Z. United Steelworkers of America, Steel Labor, (October, 1958).
p. 1.

9
The delegates spelled out what they had in mind for the aU .. powerful
W PC in a resolution which came in for considerable discussion before it was·

finally adopted.

The Union program followed much the same line as had been

adopted in previous conventions.

It caHed for: 3 substantial improvements

in wages and salaries, hours of work, incentives, job classification, holiday
a.nd shift differentials.

In addition, pressure was to be applied to increase:

SUB benefits, pensions, insurance, vacations, and holidays.

However,

what was not anticipated was the resistance of management to these proposals.
Within this framework, the area of the Committee's proposals were
determined.

When the Convention was held in September 1958, the economy

was pushing foreward from the low of the first half of the year and the recession.

Business indicators predicted a steady comeback for the last half of

1958 and continued progress through 1959 at which time economists. predicted
that the GN P would reach 475 billion dollars. 4

This was good news to the

Union when contrasted with total output which fell from a peak of 445. 6 billion
dollars a year in the thrid quarter of 1957 to a low of 425. 8 billion in the first
quart~r

of 1958.

In the light of prospects of increasing economic progress,

the Union wage policy centered about recouping economic losses of its mem ..
bel'S.

-

3. Ibid.,
4. "7 Reasons Why Business Will Boom Again," U. S.
World Report, XLV, No.5, (August 1,1958), p. 60.

~~
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Union President David J. McDonald announced in a letter to the steelworkers the desire of the Union to advance their economic progress:

From

this letter we quote: 5
A fair and reasonable wage agreement is the goal of the
United Steelworkers of America in its 1959 negotiations with
the Steel Industry.
Our Union sincerely believes it is entitled to such an

agreement.
And we believe the true facts, which are essential to

genuine coUec:tive bargaining, will substantiate the case of
the United Steelworkers of America

While admitting that there was no universally accepted yardstick by
which the needs of workere could be measured and calculated, the Unian insisted that all workers have certain essential needs that are desireable and
important in the interest of a healthy, flourishing Nation, composed of people
who live under conditions of health and decency.

Accordingly, the Union

set out to list some prerequisites for adequate living standards.
Justification for the increase was sought by the Union through the use
of two minimum. budget surveys: The

~i!I

Worker's Family Budget and The

HeUer Budget.
According to the Union's recital of the Bureau of Labor Statistic:s The

City Worker's Family Budget. the minimum income for a family of four was

5. David J. McDonald, "Letter to Steelworkers,"

May Sf 1959.
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about $4, 700.

From the annual earnings of steelworkers in 1958, the Union

concluded: "In 1958, 40 per cent of all steelworkers did not even receive
enough to be able to afford the low standards provided by the $4, 700 City
Worker's Family Budget. " 6
Statistical data from the University of California Heller Wage Earner's
Budget in September 1958, required annual earnings of $6, 087 for a homerenter and $6,435 for a home-owner.

Calling attention to the fact that in

1958, over two-thirds of all steelworkers failed to earn $6,000, the Union
justified even more its claim that a substantial wage increase was necessary
in 1959. 7

a. Wag e Inc rea II e s Neg 0 t i ate din 0 the r
Ind us t

J"

i es:

Be s ides arguing that the Steelworkers needed an increase.

the Union research department cheeked the results of recent gains by other
workers to ascertain whether those made by the Steelworkers followed the
general trends during the life

~f

the last contract (1956-1959).

The study showed that employees of leading companies in other industries had negotiated increases in recent years as had the Steelworkers but

6.

US W. The Steelworker's Need for ~ Wale Increase, p. 5.
Author's Note: The B LS City Workerts Family Budget has been adjusted
only (or fise!? in consumer prices and for changes in Federal Income and
Social Security Taxes since October 1951.
7. US W,

E con 0 m Ie Survey in Support ~ 195J Wage Policy, p. 6.

12

that deferred wage increases (negotiated in prior years) to take effect in 1959,
would raise wages of employees in the aircraft, automobile, agricultural implement, and electrical manufacturing industries.

(See TAB L E I ,

p.13)

Thus, the Union argued that a "freeze l1 on Steelworkers' wages until
mid-1960, as suggested by the companies' original proposal would put Steelworkers behind because of those automatic increases gained by other workers.
In addition to the evidence that workers in other sectors of the economy
were receiving either deferred increases or new negotiated ones, the Union
challenged especially the management of the United States Steel Corporation
on the 25f an hour wage increase given in April, 1959, to its employees in
t!1e captive

m~':les

of the Bituminous Coal Industry.

This, the Union held, was

inconsistent with the industry's demand for a wage freeze for its employees in
Steel and brought about a charge of "la.ck of principles" by the Union. 8

b.
Inc rea s e :

U n ion De man d - - Pro fit s e a n IN a r ran taW age

Record earnings' reported by the steel industry in the first half

of 1959, did not Ilip past the attention of the Steelworkers' Union.

The profit

picture of the industry, in fact, generated new dem.ands for a wage increase.
Profits for the 12 leading companies in the steel industry, totaling $694 million for the first haU of 1959 were the highest in the history of the industry.

8.

~.,

p. 22.
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TABLE

I

WAGE RATE INCREASES NEGOTIATED IN
RECENT YEARS BY 1\1AJOR COMPANIES AND UNIONS 9

(General Increases, Increment Adjustments. Cost-of-Living Adjus~nts
Inequity Corrections, and Area Differential Adjustments)
1959
Contract Expirati
or Wage Reopening

1956... 1959
Coal Minins
Bit1.lllltnous Coal
A11.llllin1.llll
Alcoa
ShiPbUildf::
Beth ehem
Can Manufacturins
American Can Co.
Petrole1.llll
Sinclair Oil
Aircraft
Lockheed
Automobiles
General Motora
Agricultural I!flemants
Intern •tl Harv.

6O.0-66.2¢* (incl. 15.0-16.6¢
eff. 1/1/59 ano lO.O-ll.O¢
eff. 4/1/59)
52.9¢ (inc. 1.O¢ C.O.L.**
eff. 2/59)
50.0e (inc. l.Oe C.O.L.
eff. 1/59)
48.9¢ (incl. 1.O¢ C.O.L.
eff. 4/59)
46.5¢ (incl. '59 gen'l incr.
aver. l4.0¢)
46.4¢ (incl. 1.le eff.
5/11/59)
44.5¢ (incl. 6.l¢ eff.
8/59)
44.1¢ (incl. 6.l¢ eff.
9/14/59)

-

November
Jul,
July
September
June

- - - - . -- -- -- - - --43.l¢
- - --- -- - - - - - ---(incl. l.O¢ C.O.L.

Steel
United States Steel

...

_.-

...

~

--- -

- .. - - - -- - . - - . - 42.5¢
- - -(incl.
.. - .I.O¢- C.O.L.
.. .. - - - -- - -- - - - .. - ..
...

Meateacking
Swi ft and COillpany
Electrical MfS'
General Electric
Rubber
B.F. Goodrich
Copper
lCennecott Copper

* 60.0C an hr for
** Cost of Living.

7t hr day.

eff. 1/59)

~

June

...

eff. 1/59)
4l.5¢(incl. annual incr. of
3.46% avo 7.5¢ eff. 9/15/59)
28.7¢

August
April (or an
time thereafter

27.9¢

June
employee, on a-hr day;

66.2¢ an hr for employees on

9. US W f Me m 0: Re Wage Increases Negotiated in Recent Years, 1959.
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The Union criticized :nanagement for its constant referral to wages as leading
to "cost push" within the economy.

If such were the case, they argued, then

the record profits would not have been made.
The Union charged that soaring profits demonstrated that the steel industry could well afford the economic improvements necessar}' {or its en"lployees to maintain a decent, American standard of living.

"How can the steel

industry still persist in the pious hypocrisy that profits are not high enough;
that its workers cannot share in ita tremendous prosperity on the just basis
of the productivity which made that prosperity possible ••• II 10

z.

Management

Defense--~ ~

!2

Catch

'22.,

Already Ahead:

'v'Yhile the Union continued to press for demands of increases in wages,
management remained as adament a8 the Union aggressive.

One of the objec-

tions posed by management negotiators was that, even with a "freeze" on
steelworkers' wages, they would still be well ahead of most other workers.
(See TAB LEn, p.

15)

The industry spokesrnen pointed out that by January 1959, steelworkers' wages were more than 84f per hour above the average et'Xlployee in all
r:nanuiacturing.

Since the 1956 agreement, the steelworkers' advantage over

the average manufacturing worker had increased 65%.

10

• U SW, ~ Labor, (July 1959), p. 1.

They exceeded the

15
TA:::-JLE

II

AMOUNTS BY WHICH STEELWORKER AVERAGE HOURLY
EARNINGS EXCEED THOSE OF WORKERS IN
SELECTED MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES 11

-

-

.809

.844

1.439 2.37

All Manufacturing
$.185
Durable Goods
.135
Nondurable Goods
.232
Aluminum
• •••
Petroleum & Coal Prod.
••••
Printing • Publishing
•• ••
... 005
Ship & Boat Building
Motor Vehicles & Equip. -.069
Aircraft & Parts
• •••
Tin Cans
.246
Ordnance
• •••
Machinery (E.cept E1ec.) ••••
lubber Products
• •••
Chemicals & Allied Prods. • •••

$.183
.120
.242
• •••
• •••
••••
-.029
... 092

Industrx

!ill

1940

1947

-

1955

- - - -.... -- .. - - BLS
- - AVERAGE
- - - - HOuaLY
-- - -EAlNlNGS
-- - Blast Fce., Steel Works,
. and .loll1J.\g lUlls *

June
1956

-

--

Jan.

.!2i2.

------

2.48

3.03

- .. - - --- . - - - - - - .. - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - --- .. ..

Source:

• •••

.220
• •••
• •••
••••

••••

$.202
.147
.268
.132
-.051
-.097
-.009
...034
.061
.245
.144
.089
.049
.201

$.490
.360
.660
.160
.010
.e20
.250
.080
.200
.320
.320
.280
.280
.380

$.510 $.840
.680
.390
.670 1.050
.150
,140
.2.50
-.070
.050
.400
.240 .440
.180
.380
.200
.450
.310 .430
.280
.500
.290
.590
.340
.600
.660
.360

Calculated from BLS data for those specific industries cited-Appendix TABLE I. Negative figures indicate earnings higher
than steel.

11.

Inland Steel Company, F...acts!2! Iv1anagement: Economic Trends
(1959), p. 6.
Autho:r's Note: Taken from
~., TAB L E I , BLS Average Hourly Earnings, Selected Manufacturing
Industries, p. 27.

l.e!!!! ~ ~ ~ Industry,

*
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waee paid to the average eiYlp10yee in durable goods by 68¢ per hour.
even outstripped the auto worker by almost 40¢.

They

This last-mentioned was

cited by management as a sharp contrast to the picture in 1940, when the
auto workers' wages were slightly over

9f

an hour more than steel.

Seven

years later, the gap between steel and auto wages was further shortened.

In

1947, steel wages were behind auto by only 3¢ per hour.

a • S tee I Pay and Cos t

0

f

L ivi n g:

In reviewing the

increase in steel pay since 1940, management argued that though the purchasing power deminished considerably, especially for those with fixed incomes,
the steelworkers' advantage had been growing at the rate of 13.7 per cent per
year (See TAB L E II I, p. 17), or an increase of 311 per cent in 11 years.
They questioned whether this increase was just.
In an attempt to stem the tide, management proposed, even before negotiations moved to the bargaining table, that the steelworkers accept a voluntary "freeze" on wages and forfeiture of the 17¢ cost-of-living adjustment
gained through the 1956 agreement.

In addition, the elimination of further

increases based upon changes in living costs was advocated.

Management

attitude was that by doing so, the steelworkers would contribute considerably

to stabilizing costs and increasing the purchasing power of those "who cannot
push so hard." 12

12. Ibid., p. 9.

-
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TABLE
STEEL WAGE COSTS va.

III

COST Olf LIVING 13
Percent of 1940

Steel Industre
Con8Ul'1ler
Price Index
'47- '49-100

Years
1940
1941
1942
1943

59.9
62.9
69.7

74.0

1944

1945
1946
1941
1948

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959 Jan •

15.2
76.9
83.4
95.5
102.8
101.8
102.8
111.0
113.5
114.4
114.8
114.5
116.2
120.2
123.5
123.8

Payroll
Cost
Per Hr.

Employ...
ment Cost
Per Hr.

$ .855

$ .905

.962
1.063
1.140
1.228
1.257
1.354
1.513
1.629
1.130
1.746
1.945
2.148
2.267
2.333
2.509
2.700
2.917
3.181
3.306

1.012
1.113
1.190
1.278
1.307
1.404
1.563
1.679
1.753
1.908
2.114
2.315
2.440
2.512
2.722
2.954
3.218
3.513
3.638

Steel lndu.trr
Consumer Payroll Employment
Price
Cost
Cost
Increases Per Hr.
Per Hour
100.0
105.0
116.4
123.5
125.5
128.4
139!" 2
159.4
111.6
169.9
171.6
18.'S.3

189.5
191.0
191.7
191.2
194.0
200.7
206.2
206.1

100.0
112.5
124.3
133.3
lL.3.6
141.0
158.4
177.0
190.5
199.2
204.2
227.5
251.2
265.1
272.9
293.5
315.8
341.2
372.0
386.0

100.0
111.8
123.0
131.5
141.2
144.4
155.1
172.7
185.5
193.7
210.8
233.6
255.8
269.6
277.6
300.8
326.4
355.4
388.2
402.0

.. Wage employees engaged in the production and sale of iron and
steel products.
Sources:

13.

American Iron and Steel Industry for coat data; Bts for Consumer
Price Index.

~., p. 8.
Author's Note: The table has been copied directly
from the source and in no way represents the computation of the writer.
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b.
Cos t s :

}t"'ringe Benefits and Increase in Employment

Employment costs have been increased by payment for employee be

nefits since costs for such items as social security, vacation pay, insurance,
pensions, and supplemental unemployment benefits (S U B) are based on pay ..
roll costs, management negotiators argued.

Thus, each new wage agreement

with the Union raised the costs of benefits per hour of work, whether or not
the benefits themselves were directly changed by the agreement.
Wage increases reported in cents per hour sound relatively
small. But an increase of one cent per hour applied to about
550, 000 hourly and salaried steel employees means added employment costs of about $15, 000, 000 a year. 14

c.

Changes in Management Attitude:

After five

months of attempting to reach an agreement, the industry began to cool to the
fact that a "no increase in employment costs II was losing momentum along
their united front.

Having jettisoned most of its "8 Point Program,

/I

the

steel firms were prepared to grant a minimal increase provided that the Union
would agree to their scaled-down insistance on work practice changes.

On

October 1, 1959, in its 15-cent-per-hour-in.. two-years offer, the industry had
decided that it would not go beyond what it felt was the average productivity
increase in 8tee1---2 per cent a year (man-hour per ton shipped).
it still insisted on setting a price for this total wage-fringe package.

14.

~.,

p. 9.

However,

19
With the first definite proposal on the table, management stated it in
terms which it felt would provide flexibility in arriving at the distribution of
the sum between wages and benefits.
amounting to 5.

5~

in the first year.

The steel companies offered a raise

an hour in increased insurance, pension, and USB benefits
In 19£0, they offered a raise amounting to 7. 3f an hour in

wages (6¢ across the board and 1.3f increase in increment) and 2. 5f increase
in fringe benefits.

The Union on October 4, wlanimously rejected the offer of the industry.

In summing up this offer, the language of the Union differed consider-

ably from the companies'.

The 2. Sf increase in insurance benefits premiums

for the first year, the Union contended nullified any increase because of the
added 2. 5f increase in ernp10yee contribution to the insurance program.

o. S¢

The

increase in pension benefits the Union claimed to be no actual improve-

ment in existing programs.

In rejecting the offer the Union tJ.'l&de it plain

that the program was inconsistent with Union demands.
The International Wage Policy Committee ••• reaffirms the
union's rejection of the industry's totally inadequate offer.
We resent the statement by the spokesma.n of the industry
that we are seeking a "something for nothing" settlement. 15
The Union analysists disagreed with the companies on the package in
terms of actual cash value, but more emphatically because of the insistance

15.
US VI.

"Wage Policy Statement,"

~

Labor, (October 1959),p.2.

20

on proposals with respect to local working conditions,

d.

Company Last Offer:

On November 15, 1959, the

steel industry's Coordinating Committee released what had become known as
the companies' f'Last Offer. II

Individually, members of management went

all-out to sell Union members on the contract offer.

They spelled out the

terms of the offer in every media from nation-wide ads to face-to-face talks
with Union leaders on television.
The publication of the offer, after it had been turned down by the Union
brought about what had been billed as the "biggest indu!tria1 relations battle"
in history aimed at an eventual Taft-Hartley vote on the industry's final
offer. 16
TABLE

IV

WI-tAT THIS OFFER MEANS TO AVERAGE STEELWORKERS 17

(Employment COst Based on 1800 Hours 'er Year)

Benefits
First Wase Increase
Second Wase Increase
Total

First
Year

Second

$173.00

.....

$189.00
$168.00

$173.00

$357.00

---

Year

.......

Third
Year

Total

$215.00 $577.00
$168.00 $336.00
$168.00 $168.00
$551.00 $1081.00 ."

." Does not iaclude possible cost-of-living which could reach a maxtmum
of $259.00 over the period.

16. Tom Campbell, "Behind Industry'll Last Offer, It
(Novenber 26, 1959), p. 53.

.!!:2!: Age,

17. Steel Companies' Coordinating Committee, "The Steel Companies
Offer," Chica 0 Tribune, (December 8, 1959), F-13. (Display Ad.)

21
The companies offer was announced as a package worth $1 t OS1. 00 of
increased wages and benefits in three years of strike-free agreement (See
TABLE IV,

p.20).

This offer was quoted as raising employment costs

to an average increa.se of 2.7 per cent or more than 30f per hour worked in
the three-year period.
Reaction to the proposal was a rejection by the Union's 33 member
Executive Board the same day it wa.s proposed in secret meetings.
difference between this and previous offers, the Union said, was a

The only
s~1:l.all

pen-

sion improvement which the Union's actuary estimated at less than one-third
of one cent.

In short, they disagreed that a 30f package for three years had

been offered.
David J. McDonald, addressing the Steelworkers during the TV meet
ing of the Month on December 13, 1959, pledged that Steelworkers would not
submit to "dictatorial demands.

If

Yes, the offer contains a few economic improvements. It
would rule out any wage raise the first year, and grant inadequate
increases next year and in 1961. But then a substantial part of
the wage increase would be nullified by other contract changes they
insist we must accept. Yes, they offer a. few concessions on insurance that do not begin to meet the needs of our people, and they
hope we will agree to microscopic improvements in our pension
program•••
And in exchange for the crumbs in their offer they insist
that Steelworkers bow down to Wlilateral changes in hard-won
work rules that could wipe out a fifth of the work {orce--ll0, 000

22
people--by cutting crews, doubling up on job duties and bilicting a
20 per cent speed-up on the over-burdened ei.nployees left in the
mills. 18

3. 1,utchell Background Statistics Report: The August report of Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell studied the statistics of annual earnings of
wage employees in the steel industry 1957 and 1958 (See C HA R T I, p. 23).
Data. provided the government by the American Iron and Steel Institute covered

425, 000 wage employees with seniority (the category of the A I S I which corresponds closely with B LS category "production workers").

In 1957. the

a.verage earnings were $5,350 and fell to $4,840 in 1958. 19
Those earning over $6,000 in both years (30% in 1957; 28% in 1958)
remained somewhat the same, while those on the lower scale ( $3, 600 and
less) increased from 80/Q in 1957 to 220/D in 1958.

Forty-one per cent failed to

receive $4,800 in 1958 as contra.sted to 33% in 1957.

The Steelworkers Union

made use of the government figures to uphold its previous calculations.
The August study issued by the Secretary of Labor also concluded (See
C H ART 1 I ,

p. 24) that: loA:a.jor wage settlements during the first half of 1959

except for a very few (accounting for 4% of the workers surveyed), increased

18.

David J. McDonald, "Text of Address: T V Meeting of the Month, If
Quoted in ~ _La_bo_r" (December 1959), p. 12.

~

19. US .Department of Labor, Background Statistics Bearing 2!:.!!!.!.
Dispute, (August 1959), Section 6.
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CHART

I

ANNUAL EARNINGS OF WAGE EMPLOYEES
IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 20

1957 and 1958

Pereentage of Wage Imp10yees
40

35 !J,....
30 ~
25

j.,

I
i

,

UDder $1200- $2400 .. $3600.. $4800. $6000.. '7200 .. $8400$1200 $2399 $359~ $4799 $5999 $7199 $8399 & over
Source: Amer1eaa Iron and
Steel Institute

Under $1200
$1200 ... $2399
$2400 ... $3599
$3600 .. $4799

1957
11
2
5

24

1958
7to
7
8
19

$4800 ... $5999
$6000 .. $7199
$7200 • $8399
$8400 & over

1957
38 221
6.5
2.5

1958
31
20
6
2

t-

ZOe Ibid., Author's Note: Thi. chart, except for the rough figure tab~tion of p;;centagea listed a.bove, in no way :reprelent. an original computation by the writer and credit should be given only to the source cited.
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CHAR T

II

SETTLEMENTS IN FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1959 ZI

,

I

"c
I

!

t

~

l

In addlt1on. 6ft of the
..ttl....ts alao libera.
lized . . 01' lIOn frilla.
beaefits.

Iouee: BLS Cuneat Wase De.,.lopMats lleport8 •
covertna neaotiatf.oDs 1Dvolvlaa 1,000
or _re workers. Ixclu.cles COIlstructi
the .ervice ta_strie.. f:l.aaRce, and
pvera.eat, ad cost-of-livtDa.

Zl. ·1bid., Section 8. Author's Note: This chart in no way represents
an original OOmputatiOn. Credit is due only to the source cited.

Z5

wages.

Half of the workers received increases of 8f or more. About 7 out

of every 10 settlements also liberalized one or more fringe benefits.

The report cautioned that many of the benefits in other industries received in 1959 had been due to increases negotiated earlier.

Automobile

workers. for example. received increases estimated at about 6. 3f an hour.
Most aircraft workers received 3% increases, a.veraging about 7. 5f in the
spring.
In percentage terms many settlements had provldea for wage rate increases of 3% or more.

Increases of 4 to 5% had not been unusual.

The steel

industry proposal was 2"0.
Among the wage settlements arrived at thus far in 1959
have been: petroleum refining, 5 percent (13.5 cents); pulp and
payer 3 .. 3.5 percent (7cents); gas and electric utilities, 45-1/Z percent (mostly averaging 10 - 13 cents); cement, mostly
4.5 percent (10 cents); chemicals, 3 - 4 percent (about 8 cents):
northern textiles, mostly 7 percent (10 centsh and anthracite
mining, about 5.4 percent (14.3 cents). Z2
The 1956 agreement which the Steel Union hailed as the greatest ever
negotiated by the Union had increased steelworkers' wages, including cost-ofliving adjustments, by about 45.7 cents (20.3%) or approximately 6.80/0 per
year.

This gain was contrasted in the Secretary' 8 report with increases,

since the beginning of 1956 in aix other major collective bargaining agreements.

(See

22.

-

TAB LE V,

Ibid. ,

p. 26).
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TABLE

V

INCREASES IN lvlAJOR GOLLECTIVl';

BARGAINn~G SITUATIONS 23
(Ja.nuary 1956-Ji.11y 1959)

Alcoa
Anaconda
General Motors
Lockheed
Rubber (Firestone & Goodrich)
Sinclair Refining
Steel

5L~
23.~
44.5~

46.14

28.7(;
44.24

45.7(;

25.1%
11.7"1.
20.6'1
23.1%
12.S%
18.5120.3%

B. PRODUCTIVITY ISSUE:
Even before the parties got to the 1959 bargaining table, the issue of
productivity was advanced.

Early in April, President Eisenhower, in a

press conference, admonished both sides to use statesmanship in their forth ...
coming negotiations.

The President sugiested that they live serious conside:..

rations to any thouaht of a price increase and wages, if increased at all, shoul
be limited to the increases in prod'l!ctivity.

Two

year~

comerence, the President had given similar advice.

previous, at a press

"The only point 1 make

is this: Covernment, no matter what its policies, cannot, of itself, make
certain the soundness of the dollar, that is, the stability of the purchasing

2.3. Ibid., Author'S Note: Credit for the data presented should be
given solely to the source credited, since it does not represent an original
computation of the writer.

2.7

power of the dollar in this

country~

There must be statesman-like action

'both 'by business and 'by labor." 2.4

In the 1959 labor negotiations hassle the word productivity had been
used constantly. but the difficulty of agreeing on a definition of the term had
never been resolved.

1. UniOA

'Y.!.!!! . . -Output l!.! Man-Hour

Worked: The Wage Policy Com-

mittee of the United Steelworkers viewed the rise in productivity

a.~

the result

of the increase in output (production) with the same input (total man-hours

worked),

The Union cited Bureau of Labor Statistics" Steel Employment and

Man-Hour figures and ita corresponding statistics for the National Economy.

and offered the follOWing data on productivity advances in steel contrasted wi
productivity chanaes in the total national economy. 25

Between 1947 and

1957. according to the Union research department, productivity in the Natio
economy went up 3.90/0 per y ...r. compounded &mlually.

In the 20-year perio

between 1939 and 1959, productivity increased by a total of 84.6%.
ded annually, this was 3.1% a year.

Compoun-

Between 1939 and 1959, the Union re-

port continued, the output per man-hour in the steel industry had gone up a

24. Comments by President Eisenhower at Press Comerence, June
26, 1957. Quoted in: U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly. 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Administered Prices ... -~.
p.
ZS. US W, Economic Summary, p. 8., essim.

28
total of 87. 9% for the 20-year period.

Compounded alUlually. this was a rate

of 3. 2o/a per year, the Union boasted.
From increases in productivity (output/ man-hour) the Union argued for
increases in the hourly wage.

An increase in wages was the only tangible way

the Union thought their members could share equitably in the increases in Hvlng standards which the natural growth of the economy made possible.
Mr. Otis Brubaker, head of the Union's research department, testifying before a Senate Subcommittee in 1957. stated that the Union does not claim
the increase in productivity in industry to be something derived solely from
the expenditure of human labor.

Likewise, the Union does not consider it

solely the result of increased improvements in technology or in better materials, better machines, or in better management•.
This business of the production of Steel, as the production of most items, is a team operation. and 'IDless that team can
function well together and unless it can efficiently apply the labor
and management techniques both to the machines at hand and to
the materials at hand, you will not get increased productivity.
And so to that extent at least, all of these factors of production
share in the productivity.
The 1959 increase in productivity in the steel industry in terms of output per man-hour was called "phenomenal" by Union leaders.

Compared to

peak first quarter figures of 1957, government figures showed that productivity

26. U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee en Antitrust and Monopoly,
85th Congress, 2nd Session, Administered Prices--Steel, p. 445.

29
ill the steel industry in January and February was up 9.7%.

This. the Union

argued, was an average increase in productivity in the industry of 4. 7% per
year for the last two years. 27
In preparing pre-negotiation data. for collective bargaining sessions,

the Union pointed to the drop off in employment. estimating that 25, 000 fewer
production and maintenance workers were producing the record tonnages
during the aU-time peak of 1959 than the annual average of 1956 and 1957.
If

Production and .MAintenance employment was 487,000 in February, 1959•••

Estimates for April, 1959. put the figure at less than 510,000.

This is more

than 60,000 below the 1953 annual employment level, and nearly that much
below 1951.

It is 35,000 below 1955 and 25,000 below 1956 and 1957." 28

Even some in management found themselves at a loss to explain the advance in 1959 productive output without an increase in employment.

In fact. the rate of productivity was almost embarrassing
and business was almost on the defensive. It was difficult to explain soaring production while employment £aUed to gain at a corresponding rat". 2.9
.

27.

U SW', Steelworkers Need for .! Wage Increase, p. 8.

-

2.8. Ibid., p. 9.

29 •

~

Age, (June 25, 1959), p. 63.

30

z.

Managem ent ~- ..Output per !!!! Input Factors:

Management

looked askance at the Union's de:£bition of productivity in terms of output per
man-hour requirements.
put was the quantity of

There was no doubt in management's mind that out-

~ioods

and services produced.

However, in terms of

input, management included, in addition to man-hours, those items considerec::
costs incurred in doing business: machines, materials, capital investment,
replacement, and taxes.

Only an increase in the ratio of output to all these

would increase productivity_

30

In a letter to the Union, the negotiators of the industry insisted that

these reqUirements be included in figuring any productivity index.
There are probably few more misunderstood words in the
English language today than the word "productivity. fI The one
thing on which agreerrle.nt is gradually erllerging is that an index
of productivity is not simply an index of output per man-hour,
because input factors other than physieal labor, sueh as research,
and development, new to(\l.s and equipment, and better management techniques. are the primary SOurce of improved productive
efficieney--in a word productivity. 31
The argument was advanced by management that wages of a particular
firm should not be geared directly to the output per man-hour in that firm because wages would .oon be out of balance with wages paid by firms where

30.

~

---- -----

United States Steel Corpora.tion, Economic Trends in the Iron and
.........................
Industry, p. 4.
31. Coordinating Committee,

Donald. II

"AprU 10th Letter to David 1. Mc
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TABLE

VI

INDEXES OF STEEL SHIPMENTS PER
MAN-HOUR AND EMPLOYMENT
COSTS PER MAN-HOUR 32

1940-1957
(Index, 1940=100)

-

Year

Index of Sbipillents
'per 1,000
Man-Hours Worked

Index of Employment Cost per
Man-Hour Worked

100.0
112.8
108.7
105.5
106.0
103.0
103.0
115.1
115.4
115.4
126.9
125.2
122.0
127.1
120.5

100.0
111.8
123.0
131.5
141.2
144.4
155.1
172.7
185.5
193.7
210.8
233.6
255.8
269.6
271.6
300.8
326.4
355.4
388.2

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1941
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
19.54
1955

140.5
140.7

1956
1957

139.2
130.1

1958

* Estimate

Memo. BLS
Steel Output
per Production
Worker ManHour, Index

100.0
106.0
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
121.9
122.1
124.8
136.1
131.0
142.5
143.7
140.2
156.3
151.4
155.7
1.54.8

*

by the compaaie ••

Source: ..... ricaa Iroa aad Steel !nst ltute.
Note: Bts data are not used because by le.viDa the Irowina nl.ll8ber fI.nd
proportion of DOn-production worker hours out of the calculation
they sustantially overstate the increase in output per man-hour.

32. Inland Steel Company, .Qp. 9!:, Table 3, Appendix, P. 29.
Author· 8 Note: The Table was copied directly from the source and in no way
.CI ...

n+ .. +I-tA ~n

••• ...... +~n1'l of' the write,.,
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changes in output per man-hour were greater or less.

This would create

havoc and inequalities in wage rates between operators of the same skills and
the same work in different plants.

"Even if year-to-year changes in output

per man-hour worked could be measured with a fair degree of accuracy--and
they cannot--tying wages directly to output per man-hour worked would result
in a violently unstable wage structure" 33 the industry leaders reasoned.
The above Table (eee p. 31) was used by management to uphold their
contention that productivity in the steel industry had been absorbed by increas
es in employment costs.

WhUe the indices of shipments had increased only

30 points and production worker man-hours 54.8 (preliminary), the index of
employment costs; according to the industry figure, had advanced over 288
points in the years between 1940 and 1958.
R. Conrad Cooper, speaking for the industry before the Board of Inquiry established by the President preliminary to the issuing of the TaftHartley injunction, stated employment costs were offset only partially by a
2% per year increaee in output per man-hour in the step.l industry. 34

The

2% was arrived at by dividing the total steel shipments by the total number of
man-hours worked each year.

33e'

However, even this figure, Mr. Cooper

U. S. Steel,.2.£• ..E!., p. 6.

34. R. Conrad Cooper, "Statement before the President'lS Board of Inquiry," Reported in: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Daily Labor Report,
No. 201, (October 14,1959), p. E-Z.

33

claimed overstated the actual over-all gains made through improved productivity because rnan-hours was only one factor in the measurement of productivity.

3. Mitcbell Report

~

Productivity:

According to Secretary of Labor

lv'IitcheU' a report, in the first half of 1959. output "averaged 50 per cent more
than in the first half of 1947, but production workers' employment increased
less than 1 per cent, or only 2.000, whUe their man-hQurs rose nearly 5 per
cent. II 35
In his report of August. 1959, the Secretary of Labor attempted to

give a closer view to the area of man-hour output in the steel industry.

The

comparison was between output per wage employee man-hour and output per
all-employee man..hour.
labor factor input.

This took into account another dimensioll of the

The report cautioned that while increases in output showe

upward trends, the gains in output per man-ho\U" stemmed from many causes
and could not be equated to outPut per man-hour alone. 36
Outp:t per wase eIrlp!oyee man-hour in steel, baaed on A I S I
reports, increased by about 74 percent from 1940 to the latest
lZ-month period, fiscal year 1959•••
Output per all employee man-hour increased by 58 percent from
1940 to the fiscal year 1959, or somewhat less than output per
wage employee man-hour••••

35. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Qp. Cft., Section 3.
36. ~., Section 9.
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In the same context, the Secretary went on to compare output per manhour in

~lteel

and a.verage annual increases in output per man-hour for the total

economy during the decade 1947-1957.

The findL."lgs were as follows: 37

Output per wage employee man-hour in steel increased by an average of 3.00/0
per year.

For the economy as a whole it was 3.7%.

The rate for the non-

farm economy was 3.00/0; for alI' manufacturlllg, about 3.1%•

. 1:.
. Ewan ClaSue-... ·~ Present Productivity

~

Signify:

Ewan

Clague, Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. in tracing the history of the compilation of productivity and other statistics by the government,
in a speech before the Chicago Association of Commerce program on produc ...

tivity, said the effect of the use of productivity statistics in wage negotiations
placed stresses and strains on them which they at present are not qualified to
bear.

IIIf there is a prospect that productivity data are to be u ••,d in strict

formula fashion in eolleetive bargaining contracts, then a much more comprehensive statistical program mUst be developed a.nd perfected in order to serve
this purpose. fI 38
Tying wages to national productivity has drawbacks and shortcomings,

the Commissioner cautioned.

First of all, while productivity of the post-war

period, from 1947-1958. averaged 30/0 in the private economy as a whole. the

-

37. Ibid..
38. Chicago Daily Tribune, (May 27, 1959), F, Part 5. p. 7.
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average reflected widely disparate t rends in individual industries.

Secondly,

whUe the entire period was marked by an average 3% increase, various years
have been lower and others have shown greater increases.

To tie wages to

ups aAd downs in a productivity ratio would cause a continuous adjustment in
waiJes and still would give little indication of the contribution of the individual
firm or industry to either increases or decreases in national productivity.
Th~

too, gains in productivity cannot be measured by the same yardstick, the

Commis.ioner cautioned.

A gain of

310 per annum woUld

be phenomenal in

the service industry where gains have been traditionally low.

Y.t the same

3'0 would be normal for manufacturing a. a whole.

c.

INFLATION ISSUE;
One of the most publicized aspects of the wage-price controversy was

tt

inflatj.on. II

Neither industry nor union leaders spared expense to inform the

public that the other must accept the greater blame for it.

Imbued with an

almost messianic mission to bring to light the contentions of their collective
bargaining poSition, they felt that the American public must understand their
respective platform. with regard to this problem.

So far as collective bar-

gaining was concerned, each held the other must hold the line: the union contending that industry must not increase prices; the industry advocating that
labor must toe the line on wage demands.

36
Basically the union .. management arguments centered about the core of
wages and prices and their relationship upon the limits of tolerance set by advances in productivity.

The Steelworkers in ita newspa.per ad called atten-

tion to the profits of the industry especially for the first hali of 1959 when they
r-;a.ched $694 million.
tant,

/I

l'hese profits the Union called "fantastic," " exorbi-

"record breaking,

II

"swollen,

II

etc.

h.ave been aggravating the trend of inflation.

From this it argued that prices
On the other side. industry

flooued its line of communica.tion with denouncements of

WliOl1

wage increases,

°288'10 increases in Steelworkers' wages and benefits in 18 years and 30% in-

crease in shipments per man-hour worked. II

From this nl81lagement argued

that wages were increasing the pressures in the economy and continuing the
upward price spiral.

1. Senate Investigation:

During the 85th Congress, and Session (1958)

the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate, undertook the task of looking into the problem of inflation.

Many leaders of intlustry and labor were called to testify before the

Subcommittee headed by Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee (D).

In his con

eluding report, Senator Kefauver explained the selection of steel as the first
iu the hearings of Administered Prices.

37

In part, the selection of the iron and steel industry as
the first to be examined was dictated by its importance in the
national economy. Though few consumers enter the market
to buy II steel" as such, the products of the iron and steel industry pervade almost every aspect of our everyday lives. Begining with the elementary necessities of life and extending through
all mode, of transportation to a myriad of goods involved in our
complex industrial system, this industry above all others is
basic to our modern economy. And in terms of national defense
its importance is equally great. 39
Gardiner C. Means, in testifying before the Subcommittee sounded a
note of pessimism a.bout attempts to define the phenomenon of inflation.

In

his testimony he said that the problem, while inherent in the character of
modern business, find. no answer in traditional economic theory.
given was that it involves a behavior entirely outside theory.

"'';:'he

reasor

He alao said

that inflation should be invedigated with real effort "to determine the area of
discretion and the conditions under which discretion is exercised." 40
During the Subcommittee hearings there was much dilcussion on the
origin of inflationary pres sure..

Some believed that inflationary pres 8ures

reflected the recurrance of demand pulls, similar to those present in earlier
postwar periods.

Mr. Kenneth Galbraith's testimony conveyed this feeling,

even though at the time of his testimony the steel industry was operating below

39. Estes Kefauver, ReErt!!!!.e Committee ~!!!.e Judiciary. U. S.
Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 85th Congress,
2nd Session, No. 1387 (1958), p. 1.
40. U. S. Congress, Senate, 85th Cong., 2nd Sesl.,

21. 9!:.,

p. 85.
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capacity. 41
William McChesney Martin, Jr •• Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, in his opening statement during the summer hearings of the Senate FiDance Committee (1958) expia!Ded inflation in terms of the problems facing the
Federal Reserve System•
• • • A spiral of mounting prices and wages seeks more and more

financing. It crea.tes demands for funds in excess of savings,
and since these derr..ands caDnOt be satisfied ill full, the result is
mounting interest rates and a condition of so-called tight money.
If the gap between investment demands and available savings
should be filled by creating additional bank money, the spiral
of inflation which tends to be cumulative and self-perpetuating
would be given further impetus. 42

2. Industry Sp!kesmen.. -Inflation!! "Cost Push":

While the Adminis-

tered P'l"ic.e Hearings were intended to study the possibility of monopolistic
tendencies in the steel industry and violation of anti-tl-ust laws, as it turned
out, the hearings provided a sounding board for both union and industry leaders.

Mr. Roger M. Blough, Chairman of the Board of United States Steel

Corporation, attempting to get through to Senator Kefauver regarding the
pricing policy of U. S. Steel. sounded a note on the recurrance of the inflationary pres sures upon steel prices.

41

• .!!?!2.,

p. 49.

42. William McChesney Martin, Jr., "Winning the Battle," Richard
E. Mooney and Edwin L. Dale, Jr., Editors, Inflation and Recession, Doubleday Headline Publications, New York, (1958), p. 17. -
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A summary of Mr. Blough's testimony before the Senate Subcommittee

is as follows: 43 The largest cost of United States Steel is employment costs-·
whether these eosts relate directly to employment costs or to suppliers.
There are two alternatives.
tively as possible.

The first is to reduce costs al rapidly and effec-

The second alternative is to increase prices.

United

States St••l had done both in an attempt to overtake rising costs.

Price in-

creases have averaged 5.6% annually during the 17 year period.

The diffe-

rence between this and coats increases has been made up with greater efficiency, primarily brollght about by investment of savings.

Price increases

have reflected primarily an intiatioll in costs which they were unable to overcome with greater efficiency.
Mr. Robert C. TYlon, Chairman of the Finance Committee, U. S. Steel
Corporation, in a statemeut also before the Subcommittee cited the relevalu::y
of employment coats to the total factor of costs of U. S. Steel.
cost we incur in providing

good~

liThe biggest

and s.rvice. to customers ia our employ-

m.ent cost--what we have to pay to or for our employees.

In 1956, this one

cost alou was 39. 7 percent of our sales." 44

43.

About it. If

Roger M. Blough, "Inflation, and Wha.t the Congress Might Do
U. S. Senate. 85th Cong., 2nd Ses •• , .QE.• .£!!., pp. 1038-1042.

-

44. Robert C. Tyson, "Testimony," Ibid •• p. 242.
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Developing the idea that employment costs since before World War II
had been increasing, Mr. Tyson's testimony went on to justify the claim that

this was the major push in the spiraling of inflationary tendencies in the eco ..
nomy.
Wage inflation underlies all other cost and price inflation.
This is becau.e the wage inflation i8 surprisingly universal and
uniform throughout American industry•••
Economic arithmetic ten. us that the new cost-push inflation can D.ever be terminated until inflation ill the biggest and
most basic cost--employment--is terminated. 45
Prior to the actual bargaining table discussions, the Coordinating Com
mitte. for the twelve steel companies .ent a communique to the Union reques ..
ting a freeze on wages. 46

The freeze was dictated, it said, by the grave con~

cern of the American epople for steps to be taken to arrest inflation.

The

need, the letter went on to say, was not to put more money in the pockets of
the steelworkers who were at work.
ployment cost increa.es and

th,u.

The real need was to avoid further em-

restrain inflation and encourage continues

progress essential to increasing employment opportunities for tho.e who were
unemployed.
On April 28, 1959, Mr. J. L. Mauthe, Chairman of the Board of the

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, made the following statement at the

45.

~,

p. 245, passim.

46. Coordinating COt..lmittee, "April 10th, 1959, Letterlf.
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annual meeting of the company shareholders in Youngstown, Ohio.
Twelve of the leading steel companies, recognizing their
responsibilities to the nation and hoping to contribute something
toward stemming tne tide of inflation, suggested to the pre8ident
of the union that it join with the com.panies in renewing, for one
year, the present agreement with respect to wages and benefits. 47

VII

TABLE

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE INCREASE IN
BUSINESS PROCEEDS .. 1950 to 1956 48
(Ia BilliOllI)

Cempen.atioa of Iqploy.e. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 68.l
Corporate Profit. (After Tax)
1.8
Corporate Profits Tax Liability
4.1
Income of Un1acorporatecl IDterpri...
•• 0 • • 0 0
209
Inventory Valuati_ A4ju.tmenta
2.9
latere.t aacI ....t • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
5.4
IJMfireet Bua1De•• Tax aad Nea-Tax Liability • • ••
11.3
Capital C...umptteD Allowance. • • • • • • • • • ••
1l.8
ot'-l' Adjut_t. to B.alae•••e" hodtIct • • • • •
0.9

.......0 0o. ..
0... . . . . ..
0

••••

TOtlL BUSINESS PROCEEDS
s.uree:

11. S. Dept.

o~

0

•

•

••

• • • • • $107.8

Coaaerce.

In preparing material for discus,ion in the 1959 labor negoti_ationa,
management placed foremost ia importance the problem of inflation and its ad·
vance by wage trend. in the iron and steel industry.

Beginning with an over ...

47. 1.1,1. Mauthe, tlAn1\lal Report to Shareholders. If
48. U. So Steel. 0E' .9: t p. Z. Author's Note: The table was copied
from the source and in no way represents a computation of the writer.
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all view on the effects of

i:nf1ation~ -(the

fact, mcmagement argued, that since

1940, inflation had reduced the value of the dollar by more than half) ..... the
statement concluded that the reason for inflation has been the inbalance create
not by a "demand pulllt- ... or too many dollars chasing too few goods--but by a
IIwage pushll--resulting from rapid increases L'"l employment costs.

Supportin

their arguments, they offered the above data (See TAB LEV I I) •
In explaining the table. management said that although the total increas a

in business proceeds advanced almost 108 billion dollars between 1950 and
1956, by far the greater portion was given out in paymellt to employees ($68
billioll. or about two-thrids of the total).

III expla.ining the expansion of busi-

ness proceeds they maintained that part of the increase was due to the volume
of goods and services sold.

The rest was due to increa•• s in prices result-

ing from increased wages not balanced by productivity gains.
At the beginni.ng of negotiations. the seene of collective bargaining was
New York City.

R.porters from the rr..ajor newspaper. had opportunties to

question the leaders of industry and the union on their views all to whether
something could be done to stop inflation in America.

Roger M. Blough, who

chose to take a back seat in negoiiaiiol18, was dubious.
that it could be halted.

But he indirectly said

nyou haven bow until you try ••• We think

80me

good

wiUcome of it••• I don't think anyone company or industry can do this job of
stem.mi.ng inflation. If 49
49. Chicago I)t.ily Tribune, (July Z4, 1959), p. 1.
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Also in the interview. Mr. Blough noted tha.t other industries had been
granting wage boosts during 1959.

But he voiced a hope that "depending u.i?0n

the ou.tcome of our stand" L."l steel, other

emploYltr~

and other mass-proUu.ctioI

irldustries would lend a. hand ill ..-eslating inflation.
This was quite more optomistic than Mr. Blou;;h' s
Senate Subcommittee.

testirno~'lY

before the

In explaining the price increase ill July 1958, Mr.

Blough cited examples of previous e.KI.)e:.dl1ces in trying to put an end to hJilation.

All these, he added, ended in :a11ure.
Going back to the exan.'lple of 1948, U. S.

St~el' i'

President Benjamin

Fairless took action to reduce prices.

He felt that costs and price spiraliug

were having ill effect ()nt.... e economy.

In a.nno!"mcing the price reduction, Mr.

Fairless eJr."})ressed a. hope that other compani.s would follow and thua produce
a c;-AAi!l reaction curtailing inflation.

In m.a.kin.g the announcement, he made it

clear that. were costs and wages to con.tinue to push ahead elsewhere, the
corporation would recind the

pr~ce

reduction and grant increases to its em-

ployees.
Feeling that other segments did not respond to the steel industry' .. ef-

forts, in. fact that many others had increased wages and prices, within three
months United State. Steel recinded its price action and gave its employees
a. wa.ge increa •••

44
This "noble ex--periment, " ••• wa.s not a total los. for it
taught us three important truths: First that no one company,
no one industry. and no one union can alone stop the march of
inflation. Second, that neither the steel industry or any other
industry ever set. the wage pattern in America ••• And third,
we learned from the stark .tatistical evidence. that a cut in
steel prices produces no discernible or identifiable effect upon
the cost of living. 50
Mr. joseph L. Block, Chairman of the Board of Inland St.el Company,
asserted in a letter to employees that the United Steelworkers Union was seeking an iDflationa.ry agreement with the steel industry while management was
strong for a Ilon-inflationary one.
The United States has for some time been marching down
an inflationary road. a road which at other times and in other
countries has led te ruin. It is highly important that this be
halted ••• The union ••• continue I to seek the type of agreement it
secured for the three year period Just ended. How anyone can
sincerely call this kind of agreement Don-inflationary I cannot
understand. 51
Mr. Theodore O. Yntema, while not connected directly with the steel
industry management. .ummarized the feeling of steel management in hi.
closing remarks before the Subcommittee investigating a.dministered prices in
the automobile indu.try •
••• The fact is that bargaining power has swung so far in favor
of the giant unions that wages are bound to outrun increases in
productivity, and cost-push inflation i. certain to result. I do

50. Roger M. Blough, nTestimony." U. S. Congress, Senate. 85th
Cbng•• 2nd Sess •• .22.. S!!:, pp. 206 .. 207. p!ssim.
51. joseph L. Block, "Letter to Employees," (july 25, 1<J59). pas.im.
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not propose and have not prOl)oeed t.i}at the unions be reduced to
impotence- .. 1 urge only that ways and means be fou..'1d to limit
their power to injure the economy.
I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. that inflation is domestic
Public Enemy No. One, and I would call it what it is, V1age Inflation. 52

3. Union Statements--Inflation Caused .!?y lnerea.ed Prices: The Union
view of the ca.uses of inflation centered about the increases in prices charged

by the steel industry.

To the proposal by the Coordinating Committee eet

out in the letter of April 10. 1959, a.kiag the Union to c:ontinue "pre.ent wagell
and other benefits, withou.t change, for an additional period of one year beyond
J\11lfa 30,1959. If Mr. McDonald replied that the proposal for a freeze in wage

and fringe benefits and the eUmiDation of cost of living adjustment. would
create an a.ctual reduction in Steelworkers' wage. during the coming year.
IIIt i. sigllificant that you did not propose or suggest that the price of steel be

frozen or reduced during the corning year, II 53the Union President charged.
To match the industry suggestion for a freeze on wages, the Union
counter-proposed that, since there could be no iDflation without pric:e inc:rease I
there be no increase in the price of steel during the terms of any agreement

5Z. Theodore O. Yntema, Statement before the Subcommittee on Anti.
!!!!: ~ Monopoly!!!.!!!.! Committee ~ ~ Judiciary, United States Senate:
1958, Ford Motor Company, (1958), p. 68.

-

53.

.
DaVId J. McDonald, "Letter to Negotiator. of the lZ Steel Companies." (April 13,1959).
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which they might reach.

The Union President stated that the Steelworkers

were ready to conduct their negotiations in the light of this principle.

"By

adopting this approach we can make a substantial contribution to economic
stability and economic progress. II 54
Attempting to 80ften the blow' of

~llduatry

statements to the public on

the role of wages i.a inflation. the Union put forth material to show that increa ..
sed prices have, if not caused, then at lea8t aided the in.flation.

All during the post-World War II period, and particularly
since mid .. l955, a major cause of price increases has been the
profiteering price policies of the price .. teading companies in key
indu8tries--auch as the steel, oil, and automobile industries, in
which prices are set, not by competition; but by the dominant
firms. '55
Otis Brubaker of the Steelworker. research department, 1.n a prepared
statement before the Subcommittee in 1957, charged that the steel price increases have resulted in increased revenues to the steel industry of more than
$3. 00 ($3. 23) for each $1.00 of increased wage and "fringe" costs granted to

the Steelworkers for the 11 yea~8 ending December 1956~ 5(,

54.

-

Ibid.,

55. US W , Why !. ~ Price Increase 1:! ~? ~ Presentation .2l2!l!
Brubaker, Research Director, United Steelworkers of America Made Before
!!'!! Subcommittee ~ Antitrust ~ Monop!ly!!!!!!! Senate Judici~Commit
.!!!. August.!:..2!!! US W Industry Conferences, 'Washington, D. C., (January
1958), p. 19.

-

56. Ibid., p. 9.
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In an effort to make a settlement before the June 30 deadline,

both

labor and managem.ent agreed to begin talks earlier to explore each other's
thoughts and review some of the facts which they ha:1 prepared.

After two

weeks of sessions, the parties were still ada.ment on their positions.

Mr. Me

Donald, addressing the National Press Club in Washington, D. C., expressed
his ideas on in:fla.tion and the possible outcome of the negotiations.
The address summarized the Union leader's contentions that: 57 There
was no reasOll why the outcome of the steel negotiations should worsen the
problem of inflation.

Unjustified price increases in the past. he cited. con-

tributed to inflation.

Current financial reports revealed record profitibility

that a cost increase several times the size of past settlements could be absor
bed and still leave net profits at a record high. with no steel price increase.
The Union pointed out that the cost-of-living figures, which reached
an all-time high in October, was further proof of the complete fallacy of the
industry'" position that earaed ,wage incr .... es ca.u.se inflation.

The Union

pointed out that the Steelworker. had not had a cha.nge in rate. for 17 month ••
Still to be considered wa. the fact that there were more than a half a million
Steelworkers who did not earn regular wages du.ring the 116-day strike period
Yet, all during this tim.., the co.t of living had increased.

57.

"This ••• certain!

David J. McDonald, '111.1. Q:buU Ipd\lstry Freeze on Collecti.ve Bargaining, Addre.s to the National Pres. Club, Washington.
C. (May
1959).
'
•

n.

u-
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is a cruel hoax perpetrated by the industry against em.ployees and the American public ••• If 58

D. FOREIGN COMPETITION ISSUE:
The issue of foreign steel competition, while it played a major part in
the attack during the early stages of pre-negotiations "sounding off of issues,'
deteriorated into neglect once the actual strike progressed.

Each side deno

ced the other for responsibility for the iDflux of foreign steel upon the home
markets.
The debate on foreign competition was carried out in the framework of
the wage-price controversy.

Maaagem.ent charged the major cau.e of the in-

crea.e in the importation of foreign steel to wage dem.ands by the Union, far i
excess of wages paid to foreign steelworkers.

Mauagement circw.a.ted adver

tisements of the American steelworker being displaced by his Ru. aian counte
part.

This brought a .torm from the Union public relations department.

Re

bounding. the Uaioa charged that increased price. provided the impetus to
foreign steel impol'ts.

1. Management ~--Foreign ~ Advantase
Costs:

~

Lower Employment

During most of the postwar period, competition from foreign steel

mills had not been serious or threatening because foreign mills were damage

58. US W,

--- -

Ste.l Labor. (December 1959). p. Z.

......

49
CHAR T

III

STEEL EMPLOYMENT COSTS HERE AND ABROAD 59

$1.29

U.S.A.

W. Ger.

Lux.

Japau

eeavertecS to U.S. Dollar. at Official late. of lxehaaae

diamantled, or ltacUy

I'W1

down during the war.

Moat European countries

needed more ateel than their domestie mills were capable of producing.

Now

foreign mills have been rebuilt, modeI'm zed, &ad expa.nded, ironically too,
with American 40llars and foretgn aid.

Steel maa&gem.u perceived the import as a potential threat to homeproduced steel.

The greateat ainpe advantage of foreign .teel producers,

management charled, was in wa,e rate..

Average hourly earninga of work-

ers in American ateel companies ",ere three to aix or aeven timea thoa. of

59. Coordiuting Committee, The Steel Nel0tiationa ~~. p. 11.
Author's Note: Thh chart has been copied from the source cited aDove and
in no way repre aent. a computation of the writer.

50
foreign competitors.

The.e data are shown in Chart IU, above (See p.49).

MaD&gement argued the reason behind lower prices being quoted for
foreign steel coming into American markets

wa. that wages were lower for

workers in foreign mins and as a result the costs to foreign producers were
correspondingly lower.

a • For 41 i gnP ric i n gPo Ii c y :

Mr. Robert G. Welch,

Executive Vice President, American Steel Warehouse As soclation, Inc., afte
a trip to Europe gave his views on the impact of foreign imports.
ried about the steel import situation, Mr. Welch answered:
entirely too much emotionalism connected with imports.

When quer

"There has been

Of course it is hard

not to be emotional when your pecket hook is directly affected.

II

60

When asked: "Foreign mills' pricing techniques seem to be inconsistent.

Why is this? ", Mr. Welch stated that foreign pricing policy carries

with it a philosophy different from that adopted by American mills during the
past decades.

In effect. they have two tlifferent policie.: 61 One for home,

another for abroad.

Their domestic policy is determined by the fact that in

countries .uch a. Luxembeurl and Belgium they are the biggeat employers in
the area.

When their busines. slackens, they drop the price even below

60. "How a U. S. Warehou.eman Look. at Steel Import Problem,
Ale, (July 16, 1(59), p. 68.
61. !Did., pp. 61.69.

If

Iron

51
their costs if necessary to keep their mills operating as close to capacity as
possible rather than pay the reUef bill. for unemployed workers.

In effect,

the los. or low earnings of the Belgium and Luxembourg mills takes the place
of unemployment compensation without government intervention.

Then to

make up such losses, they raise prices as high as the traffic will bear during
periods of high demand.
Their foreign pricing policy is dictated by the fact that one of the main
difficulties the foreign mills have is in making delivery and communications.
Therefore, foreign mills feel they must sell at a lower price.

The desire of

the foreign mills to entrench themselves into the lucrative American market
also caused them to vary their prices depending on Dusiness conditions. In a
time of excessive supply when they must edge their way into the established
American markets, they cut the price to u.nderseU American and other competitior..

However, once given the free ranle of the market when demand is

great and supply curtailed,

th~ir

prices jump up to the American level or even

exceed our 8.
Iron Age Summ.arie. give evidence of foreign pricing policy during the
early sta,e. of the 1959 steel strike.
Steel imports are now coming into this country at about
400, 000 tons per month. But import prices have juinoed sharf1y
since the strik:e. And importers are not eal~r to procfuce stee
for ordera booked earlier at lower prices. -62

61.. "Summary,

It

~ Age, (August 17, 1959), p. 111.

5Z
By the beginning of September, the pattern of pricing by the foreign
mills was well established.

They followed pricing practices determined by

the demand and supply factors in the market.
edging up since the spring of 1959.

Foreign steel prices had been

During the first week of September,

Age reported: 63 That they were about in line with domestic prices.

~

In most

cases the base prices on over.eas steel were higher, but extra charges were
less than thoae of American mills.
Week by week, the emerlenee of the foreign pattern took full command
Foreign mills intended to capitalize on their favorable market position, while
the American mills were struck, maximizing their profits.
for foreiln steel are now climbing well over mill prices.

"Broker prices
This h particularl

the ease in the Chicago area where prices are well over the mill price and ar
still climbing. " M
b.

Market Penetration of Foreign Steel:

The

steel industry. caulht in the tight sClueese of the recesaion in 1957 ... 1958, with
home production hitting a lew of 470/0 of capacity in April 1958, felt the penetration of foreiln markets more severely.

This brought about a searching

study by the industry for the extent of the market penetration by steel imports

63. "Summary," ~ Age. (September 3, 1959). p. 39.
64. "Summary," ~~, (September 10, 1959). p. Z45.
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Chart IV was sultmitted by the companies to show the differenees in import
and export ratios for 1957 and 1958.

Mr. L. S. Hamaker, Vice President in charge of sales, RepubUc Steel
Corporation, in analysing the import steel market penetration for 1,60, comroented that while the foreign steel import tonnage exceeded. exports,

8SpeC!"

ally during the strike when the ratio was 4 tons to every Z going out, the expected. ratio for 1960 was estimated at about Z tons coming in for every 1 ton
going out.

For this year, Mr. Hamaker predicted that imports would proba-

bly maintian last year's rate, especially when the foreign mills again get

65. u.s. Steel, .Qp. Cit., p. 11. Author's Note: This chart was take
from the source cited and does not represent the writer's computation.
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their prices below the U. S. market.

"Quite a few customers using imports

last year were disilluaioned by late deliveries and inflated prices.

z.

~

Defense--Hidden Costs

!E- F0t:eian waf!' ~:

II

66

The Union de-

fense centered about the argument that not only were foreign wages lower, but
also the standard of living.

The Steelworker a held that comparisons between

hourly wage rates were inadequate in determiDing unit costa of production for
domestic and foreign mills because
••• the average foreign company usually has two or three times
as many workers, working longer work weeks, than American
companies with the same production.
The foreign companies'
total wage bill could be. and in many instancea b, actually
hiaher.
Then teo, fringe 'benefits in the form of longer vacationa, more paid holidaya, family allowances, fuller medical
care, etc., raise labor coats abroad far above the hourly wage
level. 67
The Union asserted that foreign labor costs are higher than steel indus
try apokesmen cared to a.drnit.

The reason was that there are substantial

l'hidden" labor costa in all European and Japanese mills.

The Union called

attention to the fact that 68 health and insurance are listed as costs in Americi ~

66. IINo Glaring Weakness as I See It, The Iron Age Interviews--Republic's L.S. Hamaker." ..!!.!! Age, (April 7, 1960). p. 51.
67. USW. Foreie Steel- H_~ pp. 5 .. 6.
used in the quotation appeared in the original.
68. ~~~.

t

pp. 6-9.

Author's Note: The Italics
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whereas in Oreat Britain, complete health insurance and pensions are finance
mostly out of aenera! government revenues.

The Union also pointed out that

state unemployment compensation. in the United States is a laoor cost, but in
France, the national government and communes pay for it out of taxes.

In

Germany, houses have been built for workers by employers, who list the cost
under depreciation in a.c:cordance with a special la.w.
Emphasis in collective bargaining in the Unitec:l Statee ie on high hourly
wages.

Abroad, the chief emphasis is on social security and other fringe be-

nefits, the Union asserted.
Thus in France these non-hourly wage costa amounted to
59 per cent of the gross hourly earnings; in Italy they were 61
per cent; in Germany, 43 per centi while in the United States,
they!!!!:! only.!..2 per cent. 69
.
a.

Union View -- American Mill Advantage in

Material Costs:

Not only had the Union insisted that there is no lethal

threat by foreian steel production on that produced here, but that the America
producer has many advantages over producers abroad.

These advantages

were not only in terms of technology of American productive capacity and the
skill of American wOl"kers. but even more •• in terms of raw materials.

With

advantageous leeation aad an abundance of bigh quality materials: iron ore and

69. Ibid., p. 9.
appeared in the original.

Author's Note: The Italics used in the quotation
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coal, a definite lessening of cost is affected for the domestic producers, where ..
as most foreign mills were faced with added import costs because of the lack
of raw materials in their countries.
The result is that the American steel industry has a cost
advantage on materials which more than cancels ~ the foreign
companie.' COlt advanta,e on labor. For example, in 1959 the
average materials cost in the United States was 39. 3 per cent
of sales. In Great Britain it was 54. 6 per ceat, a difference in
~ !'!:!!.r of 15. 3 E.!! ~ ~ ~. U. S. labor costs were 36. 3
per cent of sales compared with Zl. 8 per cent in Oreat Britain,
a difference to ~ disadvantage of 14. 5 :eer~. 70
h. S tee I W
a "Phony" Issue:

0

r k e r s Vie w "F 0

I'

e i g nCo m p e ti t ion" a

8

The material advanced. by the Union in the argu-

ments on foreiln competition came from a documented study prepared by the
US W International Affairs Department.

Additional support to the Union's

views in this area of controversy centered especially on the Hearings of the
U. S. Tariff Commission on a complaint filed by four .. mall steel companies
who alledled that importation o,f certain steel wire products was causing or
threatening serious injury to American industry making similar products.
These hearings were held in Washington early in 1959.
It is interesting to note that the major steel companies
did not participate in the hearings--although they were privileged
to do so.
U. S. Steel Corporation contented itself with an observel'. Nor did the American Iron and Steel Institute ask to be
heard.

70. Ibid., p. 7. Author's Note: The Italics in the quotation appeared
in the original.
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Yet both U. S. Steel and the Institute at the very same
time were engaged in a propaganda campaign on foreign competition. In public speeches and in newspaper advertisements
they were saying American workers stand to lose work and
even their jobs because of foreign competition. 71
The Union took the steel industry leaders to task on the latter's defens
of imports of iron ore, inSisting that loreign ore shipments into ths country
bacl no effect on American employment.

The Steelworkers charged that the

industry took this position even though. as the Union claimed, imports of toreign iron ore in 1958 ..mounted to 410/0 .f domestic production. while imports
of 8tee1 products amounted to only about 3%. 72.

The Union was at a loss to

explain what distinction between the effect of imperts of iron ore and imports
of steel products was being made by industry leaders.

3. Secretary!! Labor' e R.po;rt .... Foreign Com.petition: James P. }.Ait ...
chell stated that there is a lack of adequate data on both total costs and labor
costs per ton of steel products to compare such differences between the U. S.
and other steel-producinl countries.

Beside., he cautioned, even if data

were available, they would not reflect d1fferences in total costs because of dif
feranees in productive organi.ation.

He gave several reasons for this: 73

First, in the U. S. the majority of the basic steel industry is highly integrated.

71. Ibid., p. 1 Z.

72. Ibid., p. 13.
73. U. S. Department of Labor • .Qp. Cit., Section 16.
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Secondly, in Europe and Japan a large portion of basic raw materials must be
imported or transported at high costs.
The report also studied increases in labor costs between the U. S. and
foreign producers.

The findings 74 showed that labor expenditures increases

(including fringe benefits) between 195Z and 1951 were less in the U. S. than in
Germany, France, the Saar, Japan, and the Netherlands but were more than
increases in Italy, Luxembourg. and Belgium.

Hourly expenditures in the

U. S. steel industry in 1951 were three to four times higher than those in European countries and seven times Japanese hourly expenditures.

These dif-

ferences were partially or wholly offset by the higher material costs and by
lower output per worker both in Europe and in Japan.

E.

FINAL SETTLEMENT OF WAGE ISSUE:
The final settlement resulted in much "deal bargaining" on both sides.

'While the agreement did res.lve the money wage issue. it failed to settle the
supporting issues which colored negotiation discussions between the contendinJ
parties.

The packale covered a 30-month agreement period.

total cost. to the major steel firms the net result was a

39~

In terms of

package (41 ~ for

firms which had to do more SUB funding) or a 3-1/2 to 3-3/4% increase in
employment costs.

14. Ibid.,
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EMPLOYMENT COST OF 30··MONTH STEEL CONTRACT 75

Insurance
Pension
ls~ w&~e

*

7.04~
3.60~

luereaau

i.i...OO~

2nd Wage Increase
Cost of Livins

1O.16~

TOTAL

7.20¢
39.000

Note:

*

The

4f

Cost at living can De used in paying for excess insurance
cost. Wage increase coat include base and increment increase and is average.
All above figures include total
cost to the st •• l firms.

an hour cost-oi-living for which the Union was prepared to go

to court and sue was traded away into the overall package and enabled the Union to get an immediate increa.se ranging from 6 - 9f an hour.

This came

from the company's picking up the bill on the insurance package by which they
agreed to pay full cost of life insurance, sickness, accident benefits, ho.pita ...
11zation, and surgical insurance.
On the pension plan minimum benefit. were increased for each future
year of service to $2. 60 a month.

In addition, the companies agreed to pay

a special retirement payment equal to 13 weeks of vacation pay when workers

75. TOIn Cam.pbell, "Steel Never Had a Real Chance- -After the Gover
ment Got into the Act," Iron Age, (January 14, 1960), p. 27. Author's Note:
The data on this table are not the writer's computations and should be credite
only to the source cited.
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retire.

It was estimated that this retirement payment would average $1,500-

$1,600. 76

Credits for pension could accrue for 35 years instead of the 30-

year maximum provision under the old agreement.

This enabled the minimun

monthly retirement payment to advance from $7~. so to $87.50 77
In announcing the settlement reached by the industry and the Union,
Roger M. Blough, Chairman of the Board, U. S. Steel, said that hourly employ·
ment costs in the steel industry as a whole had been rising at an average rate
of about 8% a year for the last 20 years.

Under the new agreement, the rise

expected was about 3-1/2 to 3-3/40/0 a year,
livinl increases.

including the proposed cost-of-

"So, instead of going up four times as fast as shipments per

man-hour, they will be going up a little less than twice as fast.

II

78

Mr. David J. McDonald hailed the settlement as one that should be
"good for the cO'W'ltry, for everybody" not too much, not too little.

79

76. Robert Young, "Key Provisions of Steel Union Contract Defined, "
Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 7, 1960). F. p. 5.
17. ftThe Price Steel is Paying for Peace," Business Week, No. 1584,
(January 9. 1960). p. 77.

tract,

u.s.

78. Roger M. Blough, "Steel's Top Official Looks at the New Wage COllI(From the transcript of NBC T V Broadcast, January 4, 1960).
~ and World Re}?C!rt, Vol. XLVlU, No.3, (January 18, 1960). p.54.
It

79. "The Price Steel,"

22. .9!:.

p. 76.
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While the controver sy generated by the productivity issue \vas not

solve cl, nonetheless, the parties re;:;olved to seek n1.ore efficiency in olleration _
In this connection the W PC stated,

"We believe in efficient operation but we

don't believe that the only purpose is to promote efficiency_

We believe that

human welfare is involved. _ • II 80
The final settlement brought mixed reaction from the parties involved.

Is the settlement infiationary?

tiThe industry says, 'Yes'; the Ad.ministration

says, 'Not necessarily'; the US W says, 'No'.

If

81

The outcom.e of the foreign competition issue was much the same as
its place in the negotiation discussloas.

A mystery.

Economic pressures bere down em. both the companies and the Union.

Unless agreement were reached. the Steelworkers were alm.ost certain to 1:e-

sume their strike on January a6, 1960, at the expiration of the court injunctio
that had halted the original strike.

This wow.d mean another payless period

for the Steelworkers who had been icU.d. for 116 days.
ne •• for the .teel eompaniee.

It would mean no busi ...

And it would mean no steel for the nation's

ecoDOmy. which wa.s already short from the previous long shutdown.

80. uTheae Are Prov1eiens That Make Your Contract Great," Steel
LaDor. (February, 1,60), p. 1 Z.
81. "Steel Now--Bill Still to Come.
ary ,. 1,60), p. ZS.

It

Business W••k, No. 1584, (Jan:

Th~re

were stn.,teglc preSSU1'e.s tvG.

the steel (:ompall.i.ed.

SOl1'.J.6

of these were heavy upon

However f for reaS()£lS pre86:uted in the Introductioll,

the se are Aot our concern here.
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CHAPTER
THE

WORK

III

RULES

ISSUE

It was over the work rules issue that most of the heat and bitterness
of the strike was generated.

Industry spokesmen insisted that they found. it

too difficult to change operating methods in recent years because of local prac
tices claus.s or work rules clauses in mo.t agreements. . The Union argued
that the rules were no bar to maximum production and what the industry was
seeking was industrial dictatorship.
A.

LOCAL WORKING CONDITIONS AND PAST PRACTICES:

The provisions in question covered thousands of local working conditions or specific parctices or cu..toms that bad grown up over the years in the
many different mills of the steel industry.

There was no uniformity in them.

Each mill had developed. its ewn.
The master alreement contained. a proviSion protecting the local prac ..
tices.
The term "local working conditions" a8 used herein means
specific practices or cu. toms which reflect detailed application of
the subject matter within the scope of wages, hours of work, or
other conditions of employment and includes local agreements, written or oral, on such matters. It is recognised that it is impractical to set forth in this Alr.ement all of these working conditions,
which are of a local nature only, or to state specifically in this
Agreement which of these matters should 'be changed or eliminated.

The following prOvisions provide general principles and prGcedures
which explain the status of these matters and furnish necessary
guid.epoats for the parties hereto and the Board. 1

In addition to the provisions contained in the master agreement, 80me

steel companies included a stipulation to further limit the area of determina ..
tion.
The provisions of this Section are not intended to prevent
the Management from cQntin.uing to make progress. AnyarbitratiOJUI arising hereunder shall be handled on a case-by-c::ase basis
on principles of reasonablene.s and equity. a
In the case of new machinery or revision of an entire mill operation.

the restrictions against work rule chang.s did not apply.

This was guaranteed

by the agreement.
The Company shall have the right to change or eliminate
any loeal working coDdition if, as a result of action taken by Management UDder Section 3--Management, the basis for the existence
o! the local working condition is changed or eliminated, thereby
makin. it uneeesseary to continue such local working con.<iitionJ
provided, however, that when such a change or elimination is made
by the Company any affected employ.e ehall have recourse to the
grievance procedure aDd arbitration, if nece.sary, to have the
Company justify ita action. 3

1. Agreement between United States !!!!! Corporation ~ the United
Steelworkers 01 America. Production and Maintenance Employees. Central
Operations ...sreel, (Aqust 3, 1(56), Section 2. ... B

z. Agreement between ~ Youngstown She.t ~ Tub. Company and
Youngstown Metal Products Company and. the United Steelworkers of . .~erica,
(August 5. 1956), Article I .. B, SectiGn Z.
3. US S and US W Alreement, Section 2 .. B ..4.
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The steel companies' "Eight Point Program !I was outlined to the Steelworkers Union in a letter dated June 10, 1959.

Briefly summarized are the

proposals: 4
Point 1

Modify ambiguous and restrictive languM-ge gO as to enable the management to make operating improvements
in the interest of greater e!ficieneyand economy.

Point 2

Add provisions which will reinforce the contract prohi ...
bitions against wild-eat strikes, slow-downs and picketing.

Point 3

Recognize the functions of man&iement to develop in¢entives and establish sound standa.rds.

Point 4

Clarify the right of the companies to change work schedules so as t. meet the changing requirements of the business.

Poi:n.t 5

Require employees, as a condition of receiving a vacation,
to perform some work in the vacation year, and. enlarge
the period for scheduling vacations.

Point 6

Eliminate the overlapping or duplication of benefits under
various programs, such as severanee allowances, supplementary unemployment benefits, insurance, pensions, etc.

Point 7

Simplify the procedure for establishment of seniority units.

Point 8

Cienerally simplify and clarify contract language in order
to develop better under standing and cooperation am.ong
the world.n, force.

After several months of unsuccessful attempts to win Union acceptance
of the "Eight Point Program,

If

the negotiators decided to revise the plan. and

hoped that this new scaled-dewn revision would meet with Union approval.

4. Coordinating Committee, uLetter to David 1. McDonald, President
United Steelworkers of America," (.June 10, 1959).
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The proposals made by the industry on October 1, 1959, were intended
to accomplish tw"O purposes: 1) Managem.ent was to take no action which would
place undue work burdens on the employeell, and Z) the Union would not restrict the com.panies from taking reasonable steps to improve efficiency and
economy in operations.
To these ends the new aareement was to read: 5
B. Thi s Agreement shall take precedence over any local
'Working condition with respect to terms and conditions of employment covered by this Agreement. and no fluch local working condition shaU interier with the application of this Agreement.
C. The Management at any plant shall have the right to
change or eliminate any loeal working condition in effect at said
plant, provided.. howev~r. that the Management will not change
.1' .Umiaat. any local world.n, eo:aditlon established by agreement
in writil'li hereafter enter" 1m. between an International Officer
• the UmOl'1 and the Chiel Ind.ustrial Relations Execlltive of the
Company, unless the basis er reason for the existence of such
local working eonElition is changed. or eliminated.
The industry negotiators also explained that they were willing in any

new provisi.on to allow an etnployee to appeal through the grievance machinery
if the change in work practices turned out to be unreasonable or unduely harm
£111 te the worker.

The arieftnee procedure was enlarged to include. that:

In the disposition of the ,rievance the burden shall be on
the en1.ployae to esta.blish the existence Gi a local worldng cGndition as defined in paragraph A and. as to the change or elimination

5. C.ordinating Committe.. Basis for Settlelllent of Strike at Basic
Steel Plallts, (S361 .. A). "Section- -Loca.l Working Conditi.ns, II p. -Z.
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of a local working condition, the burden shall be on IVla.na.gement
to justify its action. 6

before the strike tbat the old agreement put no roadblocks en their rights to
automate or to dec:ide how many men were needed on new equipment, new pro ..

cess •• , or new materiale.
er latitude t. change crew

The queetion was whether they should have greatsi~e

or other eetablished 'work practices "vhere

everything remaJned the same from a

techn&l~gical

the question was how to handle wUdcat strikers.

standpoint.
~Aanag.ment

In addition,
maintained.

that it cCJu1d save milUens of dollars me. 1£ the companies were not choked
by alreement guarantees that prCJtected old habits. 7

R. Conrad Ceoper, speaking before the Beard of Inquiry, said the eom
panies were insif!lting on the right to take reasonable
and improve effidency.

~tepf!

This was prOvided for u..."'lder the

to eliminate waste
1~anagel:nent

clause.

However, he pointed out. the agreement provisions were often interpreted by
arbitrators to mean that Iton.ee an operation rJu been rerformed 5.n a certain
way, it ean never be performed ill a more efficient manner without union eon-

lent.

II

a
6. Ibid••

7. A. H. R.askin. Labor: 'Featherbedding' Issue,
(October 11 f 1959), p. 1.

II

N~ York Times,

8. IfWhat the Fact Finders FOUlld in Steel, II U. S. News and World
Report, Vol. XLVU, No. 17, October 26,1959), p.128.
-
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Dr. aeorge W. Taylor, Chairman of the Board of Inquiry, pressed the
industry for specific instances where work rules had created management pro
blems. At one point he asked Mr. John H. Morse, one of the four negotiators
for the industry, if he thought tbat it would be helpful to ten the Board to what
extent one company's problems affected others.
Morse:

This exchange followed: 9

1 doubt very much (if that) would be helpful. I'm
afraid the panel would get bogged down in details.

Taylor: Wen, we're sure getting 'bogged down in generalities.

At the l.2th Annual Fall Associated Industries Conference held in early
October 1959, in Cleveland, Ohio, the topic, "Regaining the Right to Manage,
proved irresistible to the 600 labor retatious meu attending.

I

H. D. Garrett

of the Oeneral Motor s Detroit labor relations staff cautioned that the right to
manage was essential for a busine •• to remain successful.
been lost, it must be rep.ined.

IIIf the right had

If it had not beell lost, it must be maintained

aaainst constant union efforts to diminish it." 1 0

z.

Union ~- .. Manalement Proposes .!.O Break ~e Union:

leaders had been caught off pard by the "Eight Point Proposal.

II

Union
Prior to its

issue the Union research departmeut busied itself with attempts to expose

9. New York Times, (October 18, 1959), Part 4-E-1.
10. T. M. Rohan, "'Right to Manage' is Key Issue," Iron Ale, (October
15, 1959), p. 63.
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management views on the economic: issues discussed in Chapter II.

However,

the original jolt created by the proposal stepped up a new avenue of attack.
The Steelworker s Union spared itself no time or effort to inform not
merely its own membership but all American unionism that the proposals preseated in the June 10, 1959 letter were intended to break the Union.

Addres-

sing the tnciustry negotiators on the following day. Mr. McDonald said that the
letter confirmed
••• without any possibility of equivocation that conclusion which
the members of the union's negotiating team bad already reached-that you are determined to destroy the individual rights which bave
been carefully and. painstakingly developed under our contracts
and. that you have nothing but contempt for your employees. Your
intentions, as are now plain. are to eliminate the substance from
our collective agr.ements. You appear to be willing to permit
the union to continue to exist, but only at the price of converting
it into a company union and eliminating the protections for our
member. which we have so painfully obtained over the past 20
years. 11
Quick to defend. "past practices. " the Union viewed the proposal as an
all ... out effort by the industry to "bust" the Umen, and set it back into

II

the

abysmal depths 01. the pre-union era in the mills when the bosses ruled. with
an iran fist" and take away most 01. the inciividual job rights of workers guaran
teed under the Union agreement. 12

To each 01. the companies' "Eight Point'

11. US W, "The United Steelworkers is Not a Company Union," Steel
Labor, (July, 1(59). p. 3.

12. Ibid.. p. Z.
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proposals the Union President concluded.: "Our answer to this proposal is tha.
the United Steelworkers of America is not a csmpany Union.
Mr. McDonald, speaking before the

BO&l"d

II

13

of Inquiry, charged tlut the

industry intended to destroy the cooperative relationship which the Union had
tried to create in the ill.dustry in the 20 years that the United Steelworkers of
Ameriea. represented its members .. ·& relationship in which beth parties have
"respect and understanding for the problems of the other and in which neither
attempt. to demonstrate that it is the master and that the other must bow.

If

14

The challenging of management's .incerity was enlarged by the Union'
recital of instruetiol1s which went out in Jone. and Laughlin Steel'. Pittsburgh
District plants by J. W. Imel, Superintendent of the Strip Mill.

Union spoke.-

men quoted from the letter: 1S
It will b. the int4nt of all supervision, after full operations are attained, te carefully ob.erve their operation. and
..eiue. all forces te a mbumum ••• Due to the tr.mendous 1•••
of profit. durmg the r.ce• •hutdown,
must .triv. to accomplish maximum effici.ncy in aU c!epartme•• with the aim to
reclaim some of the.e 10•••• during the balance oi the Year' •
. .eratien ••

w.

The Union conelv.dec:l that the l.tter, dated. November 10. 1959, was

.ufficient prMf of the industry'. intent.

To agree te such preponls could

13. IDicl•• p. 3.
14. "Statement of David. J. McDonald,

11

~ Labor, (Novem."r, 195

p. 3.

IS. "1 aad Lt. 'Spe.d-Up' Program. Challenged by McDonald,
ecem."r 1 5
. 6.

tI

Ibid.,
-
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wipe out a fifth of the work force--.I.00, 000 people--by cutting crews, doubUng
up on job duties and burdening the remaining workers with a lO% speed-up. 16

3.

ticea:

~

Decisions Regarding Local Working Conditions and Past Prae

Having presented the "Eight Point Program" at the bargaining table,

management attempted to justify its introduction by referral to decisions rendered by arbitrators over an extended period. The ease most frequently refer
red to on what had become known as the "Z_BII issue was the Hoyt-Malloy or
Crane cab Case.

The notoriety attached to it and the confusion surrounding

the debate over the details of the ease has prompted the writer to bypass discuslion on it.

Instead, the follOWing eases on the local working conditions

and past practices are presented. for the reader's considerations.
Caae I: 17
Baeklround: The management decided to produce electric weld oil
field pipe.

The welders on the job were inexperienced.

creation of a job known as Welder Inspector.

This necessitated

The primary function of the job

was to inspect the pipe for defects immediately after the welding operation,
and report the defects to the welder.

After 18 months of production, feeling

16. "Steelworkers Won't Submit to 'Dictatorial Demands',"

Ibid.,

p. lZ.

17. Z6 LA 160, In re: ~~ ~ Co~y, (Lone Star Tex.) and
United Steelworkers !! America, Leeal 4134, March 3, 1956.
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the Welders were qualified, management eliminated the Inspector job and reassigned the duties to the Weldera.

The contract provided that job das.ifiea-

tiona and descriptions were to continue unless changed by mutual agreement.
Decision: The arbitrator, Jo.eph M. Klamon, ruled that on the basis

01 the evidence, the positien and contention of the Union was sustained.

The

six Welder Inspecters who filed the grievance were to be reinstated on their re
gular jobs.

Contrary to the employer's contention, the duties of the discon-

tinued classifications were still being performed, but by employees in other
elassifications.

The employer did not have the right to unilaterally disconti ...

nue an establi.h clas.ification when he thought thh to be in the interest of
efficient operations.
Ca.se 2: 18

Ba.ekl1"ound: The Union complained that the Company, without juatif!cation. diaeontinued the practice 01 assigning ene Beiler Maker Helper t. each
Beiler Maker.

It asked. that the practice 'be reinstated, the men recalled,

and reimbursed for any 10•• of earning. they bad sustained.
The Company claimed that changes in the nature of the work and the
tools used in performing it took place as early as 1948.

These changes de-

creased the Helper's work l-.d and increased their idle time.

On June 10,

18. 27 LA 262, In re: Republic ~ Corporation, cadsden ~ and
Urdted Steelworkers of America, Lcleal 2176, Umpire Cas. No. '6a, Decision
No. 70, Allgust 1, 1956.
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1954, the Company laid off 5 Helpers and. added Z Boiler Makers.
later, 4 more Helpers were laid off.
2 Helpers.

A month

There remained 13 Boiler Makers and

The Boiler Maker Force continued to increase until May 20, 1956,

when there were 18 Boiler Maker s and. 8 Helpers.
The local working coadition was eliminated. because of the Company's
belief that if the one-to-one ratio were maintained between Boiler Maker and
Helper, the latter would not bave enough work to keep busy for an entire turn
and could not live a fair day'. work for a fair day'. pay.

The Union argued that the work load bad decrea.ed before June 1954,
when the practice was terminated.

It charged that new equipment bad been

brought in a. early as 1946.
Decision: Harry H. Platt, arbitrator, sustained the grievance.

He

ord.ered the practice of a ••igning eu Boiler Maker Helper to each Boiler
Maker restored.

AD.y Helper who .uffered .. 10•• of earnings a. a result of

the elimination of the practice was to be compensated cemmensing with the
elate of the grievance.

The arbitrator atso awarded that any Helper termina-

ted. ... a re.ult of maDagemeDt'. action in ellmiaating the local working cond1-

tioa be reinstated. on the Company's rolls without 10 •• of seniority.
Case 3: 19
Background:

The Company removed crane operators from cabs of

19. 31 LA 754, In re: United States Steel. American Bridge Division,
Roanoke Plant, (Roanoke, Va.) and the United Steelworkers of America, Lo ..
cal No. 3090, Grievance Nos. A-58-1 and A-S8-Z, October 18, 1958.
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overhead cranes and req,uired the floor crews tG opera.te the cranes by means
of pendant controls.

The Union charged that the Company violated the local

practices and safety clauses of the asreement.
Decision: "lam thoroughly convincH that the Company"

action was in

violation of Section 13, which provides that the 'Company shall continue to
make reasonable provisions for the safety &ad health of its employees at the

plants during the hours of their employment.'

The srievance wUI therefore

be sustainoci. aDCi crane operators retv.rned to their jobs. " ••• Whitley P. Mc
Coy, Arbitrator.
Case 4: 10
Background: The Union centended that the Company viola.ted. the agree
ment by aSligning the .alaried employees of the A. K. or Planning and Purcha
sing Department the talk of orderins electrical material from the shops and
laying .t.f the employees in the bargaining unit.

These duties were formerly

performed by and belonged to hourly-paid layout electricians of the Electrical

Department (E. A. ) a. part of thetr work in layina out and installing eledrical
materials aboard ship.

The Union argued that the assignment of such wGrk t

A. K. salaried employees iDfringed upon the Darsa.baing \lDit.

ZOe 21 LA 283, In re: Bethlehem ~ Comp&D;Y, Sbipbuildin, Division
Quiney Yard, (Quincy Mass.) aDd. Ind.ustrial ~!! Marine ~ Sbipbui1dins
Workl of America, Local 5 (C 10). Decision No. 148, Grievanee No. 2554-A,
September 9. 1952.
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The Compa.ny contended the a.ssignment of such work to employees in
the A. K. Department was an exercise of the rights reserved to Ma.nagement b
Article

xvn of the Agreement- .. Management .Rights.

The layoff in the E. A.

Department would have occured in a.ny case even if the Company had not reassilned jeibs, management spokesmen argued.
Decision:

The ,rievance was arbitrated. by I. R.obert Feinberg. In the

opimon of the Umpire, the company did not have the right under the agreement
to as sip to newly created salaried positions the identical work previously per
formed by hourly .. paid layout electricians.
Article

The Umpire did not belleve that

xvn of the agreement permitted the company to

"dilute the Dargaining

unit or to indiscriminately re-allocate duties performed Dy its employees to
the d.etriment of the Union and. of hourly-paid employees.

/I

He ordered the

men returned to their previous assignment and ,ranted back pay for the time
salaried employees performed the work while they were on layoff.

Case $: 21

BackgrOund: The Company, in an effort to cu.t labor cost" by job combini_i. a.ssign.ed the duties of. Fork Lift Operator to an Expeditor, thu.s 8lim!-

na.tina the former job.

The Union protested that the action was in violation

0

21. 31 LA 466, United Statea !!!!!, American Bridle Division, ~
oke Plant, (Roanoke, Va.) a.nd United Steelworkers of America, Local Union
No. 3'090: Grievanee No. A .. 58-3, October 18, 1958:-

,

,
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the agreement which provided that no established practice could be abolished
except by mutual agreement.
Decision:

Whitley P. McCoy in the Umpire's decision wrote: "I have

every sympathy for the Company's feeling that there are far too many seniority units in this Plant, and that they should be reduced in the interest of efficiency of operations ••• Wages are paid only out of profits, and lack of efficiency
dimbushes profits.

But the contract itself points out the way to accomplish

the result, namely through local written agreement.
circumvented in the name of efficiency."

The Contract cannot be

He went on to say that since the lift

truck seniority unit could not be abolished at one full swoop except by agreement, neither could it 'be abolished lay dearees exc.lpt by agreement.
Case 6: 22
Backareund: Th.e expansion of the No. 1 Open Hearth, brinling the
total number of furnaces to 10 in 1953, produced a number of changes in per-

sOlUlel, equipment, aDd operating procedures.
sed to sati.fy the men.

The crew size was not lncrea

In August, 1956, an eleventh furnace was put into

operation 1tut the company made no crew size change.

The men claimed the

addition of furnace No. 41 made an already bad situation intolerable and. endan
gered the employe.s' h.ealth and safety.

zz.

28 LA 6S1, In re: Bethlehem Steel Company, Lackawanna Plant
and United Steelworkers of America, Local 2601, Decision No. 323, Grievanc
Nos: 1592 to-ii;4 and 8605, January 5. 1957.
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Decision:

The Un:.pirefs conclusion wa.s that the health and safety was

not endangered by the introduction of the No. 41 furnace.

The expanded opera

tiona had been a.ccompanied 'by improvements in the physical lay-out and in
equipment.

The arbitrator, Ralph T. Seward, also found that there was still

substantial periods of inactivity and that the men were not belna subjected to
excesaive fatigue.

The grievance was denied.

Case 7: 13

BackFound.: The a8,l"ieved were employ.e. who worked on the Stock

Hou.e joh when it was operating on a 3-turB-a-day basb. The Stock House
Run was to keep the .last fur_ce stock hou•• supplied with various ores,
rock, sinter, and other materials used in the 1tlast furnaces.
In 1952, a diesel locomotive was regularly assigned to the Stock House

Run.

It not only .liminated roany of the delaye that were unavoida.'ble in steam

engines, but was more reliable from. the standpoint of a.vailability and wa.s
more efficient.

At the same time. it confined the Stock House locomotivets

movements to s'Witching and making up trains or cuts in the yards adjacent to
the 'bla.st furnaces an.d reUeved the run of the duty of collectillg n'laterials fron:
stockpiles widely scattered a'bout the yards and of weigbinl the ears.

The ••

2l. 24 LA llo, In ro: R.publi~ §~ Cor~rati?n, Gads~en ~ and
United Steelworkers of. America, Local 2176 (C 10), Decision No. 15, Um~
pir~Ca"N";. 1,7: orievance No. G-1239. March 25, 1955.
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last two op.rations (gath.ring and w.ighing). the company estimated. consum
approximately 50% of crew time b.fore the changes were made.

In May, 1953, when the third turn W&8 taken off, the affected crews
w.r. red.uc.d or laid off.
D.ci8ion:

Harry H. Platt rueld that u.nder a contract providing that

the employ.r may change or eliminate existing workin, conditions if the N8is
for their exi8tenee is removed by action taken under management rights, the
employer diel not violate the agreem.ent.

In eliminating the third shift on in-

traplant steam engiae runs by sub.titution of elie.el for steam enaines and.
chanles in locomotive equipment the employer was within his rights to rearran,e crew members' eluties and. reor,aui •• the duti.s of the remainina employ.... Since the chan,es macle were incidellt to the employer's sub8titution
of .qu1pmeat. these w.r proper action Wld.r the mana.gem.nt right clause.

ease 8: Z"'
Backlround: Prior to the iastallation of a trough displacement mechaDism, two work.r. were assip.d to each machine. With the change, manage
m.nt redllCe. from two to one the number of mea ill certain classifications
assianed to the machines.

The union protested that this was an .stablished

practice au.d could DOt .e chan,ed.

The contract provided that .xisting job

2.4. 23 LA 1 U, In re: ~ !!!! !!.!.!1 Company. (Lon. Star Tex. ) and
UDited Ste.lworkers ~ America, Local 4134, (ctO), August 27, 1954.
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classifiea.tiou may not be chanced except by mutual a,reement.
Decision: "With respect to the reduction in the number of Trou,h .. men
assiped to work on each machine, the record is abundantly clear that the in..
stall&tion of the trough displacement machanism obviated the need for more
than one person per machine in that classification.

II • • •

Harold M. Gilden.

Case 9: 15
Back,rouad.: The Weiper's principal function was to see that the different heats of st.el were kept identified ..s they passed throuah the heatinc
and rollinl operatioas.

He was to tal the test pieces cut from each heat.

In

addition, along with the BiUet Yard. Chalmnaa aad the Chief Stocker, he was
responsible for recording the quantity of billets which were charged in the
furnaces.
The eUmiDation of the Weigher's job was made possible by the installa
tion of a communication system connecting the various furnaces with the operating stations on the mUl.

All other duties were parceUed out to various

other workers.
Decision:

The arbitrator, Ralph T. Seward, ruled, that: After maIdn

technological changes which rendered unnecessary the principal function of
the job, the employer was within his rights to abolish the job and reassign the

ZS. 26 LA 146, In re: Bethlehem Ste.l Company. Lebanon Plant and
United Steelworkers ~ America, Local 1
Decision No. 191, March 1, 195

m:-
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remainina minor duties of that JOD to' other employees in the bargaining unit
who could handle the additional d.uties.

"There is clearly nothbll ••• which li-

mited management's right to install its worldna procedures once theee eyetem
were instaUed. A. tlae evid.eDce and arpments do not support the claim of
contract violation mad.e ill. this cas., the grievance must be dented.

II

Case 10: 26
Back,rounci: Management held that though it did Bot have the authority
to make minor changes in JOD description it retained full authority to change

jGb contoRt.

The Union argued that SectiGn 9 .. E "Rate. of. Pay" proldbited

changes in any job where the content of the job wa,s not changed as much as
Gne full job

ClaS8

or mO're.

Section , ... lC pre8cribed the procedure for chang-

ing Job d.escription. where job content changed by one grade

0'1'

more.

No

procedures wel'e prescl'ibed for chanae. 1e88 than this.
~eci81ol1:

J. Fred Holey ruled that management was within its rights

since thel'e was no contract pl'ovtaion prohibiting its action.

The grievance

was accordingly denied.

2.6. at. LA 125. In re: UDited State. ~ COZ'p!ration, Tennessee Coal
and Iron Division and United SteelwO'l'kers of America, Local 42,03, Grievance
2,5., 1 ill, March 30, 1956.
- -

N<i:
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Case 11: 1..7
~klroun~:

Under an established pra.ctice when a vacancy wa.s createc

on a. shift. it wa.s filled by moving up others in the crew. :M'anagernent held thai
it hael all the repairmen it n.eded to do the work.

The normal complement of

repairmen was on hand to replace the absent repairman.

The "excess" repair

man was carried only to the extent that his services might 'be needed, management helcl.

Management stated that there was nothing in the agreement requi.

I'm, it to "make

It

a vacancy or to assigD more men as repai!'men than we!'.

actually needed.
The Union held that management must follow its usual practice of tem-

porarUy up-Fading other employees of. the crew to repairman's classification

to replace an abseat regular repairmaa.

They contended. that it was an f)stab·

lished practice and could. be dismissed. except by mutual consent.
Decisioll:

The permanent arbitrator u:n.der the alr.ement, Ralph T.

Seward, ruled, that: "Though the UDioa was leaning its ease on the 'practices'
provisions of Article fi, Secticm 3, it could point to no instance in which Ma;"
nagem. . had. ever dOlle what the Union is here demanding that it do. As the
grievance is completely without contractual support, it must be denied.

II

1..1. 1..1.. LA SIO, In re: Bethlehem. Steel Comenr• .Lakawa.nna. Plant and
United Steelworkers of America, Local 1..604 (CIO). Decision No. 65. Grie ..
mce NO:" 1079, Mai13,li'Si:-
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Case lZ;

za

BaekgrO'UDd.: On August 22, 1958, a number of employees Signed a
grievance prot.sting the Company's action of lIarbitrarilyand unreasonable"
c::ontrac:t:i.Dg out work to other concerns that could. be and previously were perframed 'Dy company employees. At the time there were a. number of employee
who bad been laid off for aaout one a.nd one-half years or more for alleaedly

lack of. work.

The Union. charged that the Company was in violation of the

agreement Dy induci:ag a partial lockout eI. a number of employee. who would.
otherwise .e working were it not for their practice of 8UDeontracting.

The ccmtract contained a maRa.ement clause. Section 11 Mauagement,
UThe ma:aagernent of. the Company and the direction of working forees, inc:luding the right to hire, suspend. lOr cUscharJe for proper cause, or transfer, and
the right to relieve employees from. duty because of lack of work, or for other
legitimate reasons, is vested. exclusively in the Company, provided. that this
will not 'lte used for the purpose. of discrimination again at a.ny member of the

Union.

It

Decision: The Court was unable to find in any proviSion of the contrac
that tile Company had su:treDd.ered it m&D&lerial ripts to contract out work,

is.

Preatlee Hall IDe •• '59 Amerieaa Labor Cases, uUnited Steelwork
era of .Amarica, A FL· C I 0, PIamtfll. v. '~'a.rrior ana: Gulf Navigation Co. ,
DefeDdaD.t, U. S. District Court, Southe:tn District, .Alabama, Southern Division, No. Zll. December z.z., 1958. II Prentice faU, Inc., Engelwood Cliffs,
New York, (1959). pp. 333-335.
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or to confine in an arbitrator the right to review eases regarding the contracting out of work which could be performed by its employees.
The Court ruled that the contracting out of repair and maintenance
work, as weU as construction work. was strictly a function of management

not limited in any respect by the local labor aireement.
B. SCHEDULING AND HOURS OF WORK ISSUE:

Durinl the 1957 ... 1958 recession the curtailment of busineas activities
caused. operations to sUde be1O\V 500/0 of steel industry capacity by April 1958.
Economic pressures during the recession were heightened by industrial frustrations over the acaeduUnl of production.
The 1956 Me.ater Air.em. . (Section 10. D. 3) provided that changes i
schedules could 'be made 'by the Company at any time except where local mana
lement and the Union had joined in either written or oral agreements that
schedules could be chaaged only by mutual approval.

The agreement further

stipulated that any changes made after Thursday in the work week preceeding
that in which the changes were to Decome effective bad to be explained to the
grievance or assistant arievance committeeman of the department affected.
Changes in such schedules were limited to ''breakdowns or other matters beyond the control of Management.

II

Z9

Z9. Apeement US Sand US W.

Section 10. D, 3.
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The steel industry's 1959 proposal requested the above clause be
chan,ed te read: "breakcioVllls, requirements of the business, or other matter
beyond. the control of the Company." 30
Penalties were placed upon management for changes in schedules after

their posting on Thursday.

The old aareen:umt

provided~

Should. changes be made in schedules contra.ry to the pl"Qvisions
of Paragraph 3 above 80 that an employee is laid of{ on any day
within the S scheduled days and is required to work 011 what would
otherwise bave been the sixth or seventh workday in the schedule
on which he was scheduled to conunel'1c::e work. the employee shall
be paid for such sixth or seventh day worked at overtime rates
in accord.a.nce with Seetioll 11--Overtime-Holidays. 31
The compames also asked that schedule changes be made without incurrin, these penalties and that those companies now required to post schedule s
on Thursdays be allowed to make changes. without penalties, as late as Fri ..
.3_

\;I.<III.y.

32

1. Manasemeat View ..... Firms Pay!!! Work ~

~~:

The companies

believed that it was in the best long-term interests of both the employees and.
the companies that the lImoa accept the schedulin. proposals to meet the requirements of Dusine.8 demands.

The sUI.ested change. would relieve the

30. Inlaad Steel Company, Omcial~,
31. Alreement US S and US W ,

3Z.
3, 1959,

II

"Exhibit E, "p. 9.

Section 10. D, 4.

Coordinating Committee, "Letter to Da.vid. J. McDonald, October
(8361), p. Z.

·'.

'
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companies from paying overtime rates when a schedule was changed and employees did not work more than 40 hoUl's in a work week.

The ability to satie

fy customers and meet customers' demands without additional costs required
the above chanae in the agreement, management a1' gued.

w.

D.

l~ell,

editor of The Chicago 'rribune and moderator of the

December 13, 1959 debate between Joseph L. Block, Chairn'l8.l1 of Inland Steel
Company, and David J. McDonald, US W President, asked the former to ex...
plain how the air.cement prevented management from making economic progress as long as it contained the scheduling provision •
• • • There is a clause that has oDUgated the companies to pay
mORey for work not clone if schedules were chanCed. Now, sometim.es customers caneel orders and change orders and a mill
cannot operate, lett s say on Monday, if it was scheduled on
Monday, but will start on Tuesclay. As a result of this clause,
if the mill operates on Saturday, then it ia considered an overtime
day even thoup the opera.tions have only gone 40 hours, which
is the standard werk week. 33

z.

~

.!!!!:'-... Men Weu1d!! ~ ~ Z4 ... Hour

Call: Management's

proposal on scheduling practices met with strong resisteDce from the Union,
a8 another infringement on the ''hard-earned'' rights of the steelworkers. It
looked upon the provision as a surrender to management giving it a unilateral

right to change or alter work schedules without advance notice to employees.
If the industry succeeded in its plan, the Union said that its "rights to enforce

33.

Chicago Tribune, (December 14, 1959), F. Part I, p. 3.
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decency and justice for employees would be tossed out the window and thousands of workers would be sUenced.

II

34

The rights asked. by the companies, the Union charged coukl be enIarg
to include: 35 1) scheduling employees on split work weeks; Z) posting schedules on Friday rather than on Thursday; 3) changing sched,.1les after they were
posted on Friday; 4) permitting higher company oHicials to tell department
superintendents to change schedules after they were posted on Friday.
The Union inferred that such scheduling proposals would deprive the
men of the opportunity to take care of their family and personal obllgatiol1s
beyond their jobs in the steel mUls.

The Union objected because " ••• it would

be like a Jumping jack ... ·in and out of bed, with no opportunity to make plans
for the week-end; no opportunity even for the man to take his family to
church." 36

3.

~

Cues

~

Schedulinl

~ Hours ~

Work: WL&nageme nt insisted

that it was hamstrung in attempts to bring about economical rneasues in ache
duling because of. local practices and/or agreements.

The 1959 management

proposals were brought to the barlaining table to expancl the latitude of aeterxnination of previously surralmered management rights.
34. US W, ~te"~~ Labor, (October, 1959), p. Z.
35. ~., pp. 4-5.
36. Chicago Tribune, (December 14, 1959), F. Part I, p. 3.
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Listed below are a number of cases dealing with scheduling and hours

of work which might prove helpful to th.e reader for a more intelligent understanding of the many variatio."'ls involved in this issue.

Case 1:

37
•

~il'ound:

In 1948. a list of Zl Assortors in the Finishing Depart-

ment was made giving their plant:. department, and occupational seniQrity dat.:33
The "Agreement on Assorting Ror."le
. lf document set

£ort..~

as of 12-13-'48 were to be considered as thf! normal

that those

worl~

O"l

the Hit

force and any girls

coming into the department after the date would be considered over the regular
work force and would be relea.sed if the work slackened. before t.."'le liregulars II
would be placed on short work week..

The document also stated tha.t the ori ..

ginal 21 would "share fI the work as provided for in the a.greement.
Though the document had llot been signed by management, the latter
used it in the disposition of a previous grievance (N .. S7, October, 1951). Hence
this, the Union held, constituted a local working agreement ....,Article 1-3-c.
The aggrieved employees contended that management violated the agree ~
ment when it scheduled them for a four ..day (32 .. Hour) week before laying off

all junior employees of the department, even though the plant units supplying

37. 31 LA '6a, In re: Republic ~ Corporation, Niles ~ 2! the
Warren District and United Steelworkers of Ar.aerica, Local Union No. 1338,
Grievance No. N:n4, September ZO, 1958.

a8
the assorting room were on a 3Z-hour work week.

The union asserted that

the local working conditions agreement protected the regular assorting room
employees' full work week from dilution by the "Warren girls" who were trans
ferred. to the assorting room clurinl periods of. temporary increased workloads
The Company denied any violation.

It said that the local working agree

ment was entered into to equalise 5-day work weeks for a basic complement of
regular As sortora when the supplying unite in the Finishing Department were
on a 5-dayweek. Since the Finishing Department was on a 3a-hour week, maDagement claimed

DO

wrong in scheduling the Assortors for the same distribu-

tion of. work as provided in the master alreement--Article 10, Section 6.
Decision:

M. S. Ryder, the referee. wrote: "It would .eem to this

Arbitrator that the managerial right to schedule the work is not really serious
ly impaired or iDhilri.ted if the workbll condition in question is observed at a
time when the cutting lines are scl1eduled for a "'-day work week.

II

He conti ..

nued on to eay that assumiag that the rescheduling lessened the supply of work
to the Assorting Room, then a layoff of the junior Assortors should take effect

aDd then if the work was still in short supply for the senior Assortorl compo-

sing the normal working foree then a distribution of the work on a basis of
less than 40 hours per week could take place UDder the terms of Section 6 of
Article 10, to the point, if necessary of a "'-day, 3Z-hour work week.
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Case 2.:

38
.Ba.ckll-Ound:

The Union stated that a ZO .. year practice of scheduling

senior employees in the Cold Mill Sbipping Department for 5 days worh: as

lon~

as the unit itself was scheduled for a 40-hour week constituted a Illocal agreement" even though it was oral.

The Union introduced testimony supporting ita

allegation that regardless of the tluctuations of perations from day to day
within a seheduled work week the senior employees were retained for 5 days
on their leheduled jobs and the junior employees were bumped to lower jobs
or laid off.
The Company said the basic agreement stated that the company may
schedule its employees as it saw fit and may change i1$ sehedules from time to
time as the requirements of business dictated.

It claimed it was following

the agreement provisions for dividing available work among all employees du-

t"ing production cut'backs and protecting the rights of junior employees in the
department.
Decbion: The Board of Arbitration, Sidney L. Cahn (Chairman; Harry

S. Holman (Company-appointed arlritratorh and Francis I. Stark (Union-appointe~

arbitrator) ruled that the practiee relied upon by the

Unio~

co:n..etituted a "local

working condition" within the meaning of Section II-B of the agreernent.

The

38. 31 LA 855, In I'e: ~ ~ LaUlhlin Steel Cor~r&tiont .l.:Jittsburgl1
Worke and United Steelworkers of America, Local. 1843, Docket No. lS0 .. C-56
'No. 14a...405;-Grievanc.No~ NS~-5'i, Decem'ber 4, 1958.

'Case
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senior employees were entitled to demand that the condition remain in effect.

Case 3: 39
packground: During a slack period the company unilaterally established
"short week" schedules of 32, hours or more.
pany's action.

The Union contested the com-

It held that the company was required by the agreement to ob-

tain the Union's consent to share-the-work schedules, and senior employees
should not be included in such arrangements.
Decision: The arbitrator. Ralph T. Seward, ruled that the company
was within its rights.

He interpreted the agreement to mean that the employ-

er was required to obtain union consent only if average scheduled hours of em
ployment in the seniority unit fell below 32, hours per week.

This he said in-

dicated the parties' recognition that union consent was unnecessary if average
iiicheduleci. hours equaled or exceeded 32. hours per week.

'rhe agr.ernent's

seniority provisiOn, tne arbitrator thought, was not to be interpreted as lim!ting the .1nployer's right to schedule employees on share-the-work-basis,
aince to do

1li0

would ren<ier the work-scneCiulina provision. superiluous.

39· 2,9 LA 397, In re: Bethlehem Steel Company. Bethlehem Plant,
(Bethlehem, Fa.) and United Steelworkers 01 America. Local No. ZS99, Decision No. 369, Grie....~~-i~s;14ijO et &1:, Oe·tObe-r-~ • .L 'is'?.
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Case 4: 40
Background: On or about February 10, 1957, the reduction in work at
the department resulted in only one motor inspector being scheduled to work
on the lZ-8 turn at the Halielwood Cold Finishing Department.

Previously,

the motor inspector was accompanied by another person when he was behind

the panels changing fuses and lights or when stopping and starting motor generators.
The Union argued that eliminating the helper was unsafe and unhealthy.

Management ar ,ued that in the routine inspection of the substation, performed
by one motor inspector, he was not required to make repairs if it would not be

handled in a safe way.
Decision: Sidney L. Cahn, who handled the case, ruled that the motor
inspectors were not bebll required to work under conditions that were unsafe
beyond the normal hali&rds inherent in the operation.

He cited. that the duties

involved entailed 80me risks whether done by one or two or more employees.
The grievance was denied.

40. 30 LA 395, In re: Jcmes and Laughlin Steel cornration and United
Steelworkers of America, Locall.3., Docket No:-IT4- C-5, Case No. 8-188
Grievance No. NS-3-A-S-57, April 3, 1958.
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Case 5: 41

Background: During a slack period in the company's opera.tions, mana.gement removed the MUlwright Helper and the Motor Inspector Helper from
the 3 -11 and 11 -7 turns.

The company reasoned that the crew reduction wa.s

breught about 'by a reduction of a two furnace operation to a single one.
The Union contended that a local agreement was established and the
Helpers could not be removed since they were the regular crew.
Decision:

Harry H. Platt denied the grievance because the basis for

the local working condition which the Union relied upon had been changed by
the furnace operation reduction.

C.

WILDCA T S TRIKE ISSUE:
The work rules issue was further enlarged by the controversy over the

wildcat provisions of the 1956 a.greement.

While ma.na.gement strongly insis ..

ted that changes were necessary, the Union persisted that changes were unnecessary provided that both parties to the new agreement lived up to the spirit
of that agreement.

41. 31 LA 217, In re: Republic Steel Corp?ration, Thomas ~t and
United Steelworkers of America, LecarniZ, Decision No. 163, Caee No.
1794, Grievance No. TH-435, June 18, 1958.
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1. Management ~--Existing Provisions Ineffective: Throughout the
dispute the steel companies contended they bad lost production of 7Z9, ZOO tons
of metal because of 788 wildcat strikes in the three year term of the 1956

a.greement (Sae Table Vm).

The industry a.sserted this proved existing con-

tract prohibitions against unauthorized walkouts were ineffective.

TABLE

IX

WILDCAT STRIKES IN STEEL INDUSTRY 4Z
Loss of Steel Production

Year

Nat Tons

1956

335

1957
1958

,148

*' AIS
'kif

213,900
368.700
146,600

305

188

**

TOTAL

fora 109

AISI

The old agreement did give the compames the right to discharge wildcat strikers by virtue of the :lNo Strike" provision.
There sha.ll be no strikes, work stoppages, or interruption
or impeding of work. No officer or representative of the Union
shall authorize, instigate, aid, or condone any such activities.
No employee shall participate in any such activities. 43

4'1.. Inland Steel Company, Economic Trends, Appendix, Table 14.
p. 33. Author's note: This table in no way represents a calculation of the
writer and should be credited only to the source cited.

43. Agreement, GSS and USV{,
Parties," Subsection 3.

8ection 4

u

"Respollsibllites of the
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However. companies objected to some of the decisions rendered by arbitrators in cases which were sent to arbitration.

44 For example, the wUd-

cat strikers could be reinstated if it was found that the lnanagement had failed
to discipline previous strikers whose guilt was as grea.t or greatar than the
employee di scharaed.
The companies felt that any employee who violated the agreement
should alone be held responsible for his action and should not have the right to
file a complaint that others were not disciplined.

Management proposed: 45

Violation by an ernployee of any provision of subparagraph

Ca) of thi. Section .hall con.titute preper cause for discharging
him, irre6pective of wAetb.er ather employee. who 'Violated the
provi.ion of tW. Section are discipUned.
In their initial proposal the compaDi.s clem.anded that the ar'bitrators
'be deprived of any power to mitis.te the di.cipline and management be given

the excl".ive ript to choose which .trikers .hould be di.ciplined and hew. To
combat a.uy po••i'Dle r .....r.al iD. arbitrative decisions, the followina clause

was proposed. 46

.064. "1adla.stry Dropped 8 Major DemaDds in Steel Accord,"
Jour_I, (Janual'Y 7, 1960). p. .. •

Wall Stree

..,. Inland. Steel Company. Official Text of Ialancl' s OUer, Article IU,
Section 5, Subsectiol1 (d), p. 9.
--

46. US W, Steel Labor, (October, 1959), p. 4.
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Should it be determined by the) Board that a.n employee has
been suspended or discharged for cause. the Board shall not have
j\1risdiction to modif)~ the degre.e of discipline imposed by the com ..
pany.
In addition to having an unreviewable right to discharge employees en ..

ga.ged in wildcat strikes, the companies desired exclusive economic measures
in disciplining UDauthorized strikers whom they might wish to reinstate.

Some

of these measures were: 47 1) forfeiture of 8 hours vaca.tion pay for each ca-

lander day on which the employee violated the "No Strike" provision and 2) los
of one credit unit of Supplementary UnemploymeD.t Benefits.

z.

~ ~-"provision.

Adepte, Changes Unjustified: On Decem-

'bel' 13, 1959, David J. McDonald eAsased in a public c:ieb&te on television with

Joseph L. Block. Board Chairman of the Inland. Steel Company.

During the

course of the airins of their disagreement, the US W President commented
that the prOvisions in the existins agreement were adequate in band ling \rild-

eat strikes. What the

"Ireenu~nt

did not provide, the Union chief charged,was

the determination of responsibility in the provocation of the strike •
• • • I defy any leader of management to tell me one wildcat strike
which has not come about as a result of the deliberate violation
of the existina labor agreement by management••• We think this
thing is deliberately ca.used by management and the union had absolutely no recourse at all.
This thing goes on all the time •
• • • W(-:. don't want wUdcat strikes- .. &Ur people want to work. 48

--,,----47. J~i<!.,
48. Chicago Tribune, (December 14, 1959), F. Part 1, p. 3.

, '
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The Union attacked the management propos3.l for unlimited jurisdiction
in wildcat disputes.
to nothing.

The a.cceptance of thb would reduce the rights of workers

By granting man&aem.ent a free hand in determining either disc:har

ie or reinstatement with loss of benefits would add to the discriminatory prac-

tices ap.iast union workers aad. result in Itsevere, wrwarranted penalties on
wUdcats.

II

49

3 ••~e

J?~islon,!J

!!-..elardiuj Y.'!ldcat Strikes: The area of. the wildcat

tssuewa. complicated, ... the prevleu.s issues were, by referrals to conditio..
often elouded or overshad.owM 'by partic:ular details which the parties attempt..
to g_.rallse.

In their arguments the •• overgeDeralizations complicated the

practicability of reaching a. mutual basis fer discWlsion.

"v\·hile management complained. that the existing provisions offered little
hope for success in handling the work foree &ad necessitated change, the UniOll
protested that the provisions were souad. a.nci any chana. in them would accomplish noth.ing more tba.a another surreacier.
To eomplete the 4isc. . .lon on the wildcat strike issue the writer has
selected the follOWing decbions.

49. US W t Steel LaDer, (December, 1959), p. 10.
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Case 1: 50
13ackgrou.nd: An employer discharged the union president for being
ahsent from work without proper excuse in violation of an established plant
rule.

It was contended that this discharge constituted an unfair labor practice

The local agreement had a "No Strike" provision.
The employer was advised by the union's parent international that the
strike was unauthorized.

When the union continued the .trike, the employer

discharged 9 of the 11 union officers and committeemen for having instigated
the strike.
During the strike four employee. partic:ipated in serious picket Une mis conduct, including the overturning of a truck carrying nonstrikers into the
plant. roc:k throwing, and mas. picketing.

When the strike ended, the employ ...

er reinstated all strikers, except the four.

The reason given was their picket

Une misconduct.

The four discharged employees appealed the case to the Na-

tional Labor Relations Board.
Decision: The aeneral Counsel ruled, on an appeal from the interim
decisions of Regional Directors in complaint cases, that: The Employer was
entitled to discharge those employees whom it considered responsible for instigating a strike in violation of a no strike agreement and to reinstate some
50. 41 LRRM 132.9. Case No. F-Z5~; January ZO, 1958. Bureau of Na.
tional Affairs., Labor Relation. Reference Manual, "Administrative Rulings
of National Labor Relation. Board, General COUllsel. 1/
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of those discharled and lawfully to refuse to reinstate others.

The employer's

decision not to reinstate the four employees in question was based on their par
ticip&tion in violence and other serious picket line misconduct and not on their
union member8hip.
Case Z: 51
Back,round: A:n. investigation, ordered after the receipt of a complaint
from. the police department of larle-scale gamblin, in the plant during working
hours, pointed to a union steward as the "Banker" in a "Nur.nbers Game" conducted on the company premises.
The individual was given the option of Deinl discharged or resigning in
lieu of discharge.

Upon his refusal to resign, he was terminated by the em-

ployer.
Four other individuals, including the Union's financial secretary and
three union stewards, held a meetina at which it was decided to call a strike.
On instruction from. the financial secretary, the three union stewards urged

employees to walk off their JODS.

Many responded to the strike call and the

work stoppage lasted until the next day.

After an employer investigation to

fix responsibility for the strike, the union's financial secretary and the three

51. 4% LRRM 1335. Case No. F-479. July Z4, 1958, BNA,
lations Reference Manual.
,

-

~r Re

ste'1'(al"d,s were terminated for instigating a violation of the contract's "No

Strike \I claus e.
E~ion:

The General Counsel refused to issue a complaint charging

the employer with discrimination against union members.

Termination of the

four who were leader s of the strike called in violation of a "No Strike" clause
in the Union. cGllective bargaining agreement with the employer did not violate

the N LRA, since the strike was DOt an activity protected under the Act.

The

Counsel ruled that tIlere was no evidence that the strike leaders selected for
discharge aecause of participation or noa"'participation in any protected activity 'but on the contrary. were in violatioa of the terms of the agreement contain-

iag a "No Strlke lt clause and a detaileclarievance procedure.

Had the charging

inciividuals felt they had been unjustly discharged, they should have had re ..
course to the grievance machinery guaranteed in the contract.
Case 3: 52
Backlround.: The union members had a meeting earlier in the day and
decided that no new furnaces would b. fired until pending grievances were settlec1.

Donald Pitel, while 1\01: baving attended the meeting. bad been informed

of the men's decision.

52.

When ordered to fire up No. 41 furnace, h. refused

28 LA 641. In re: Bethlehem Steel Comp!ny, Lackawanna Plant
LociI'""2bOl, DecIsion No. 318, Grievanc

and United Steelworker ... ot AmerIca,
No. 8629, Ma~r 9, 1957. -

Jr.'O

and was sent kome.

The other w&rker. informed Bupervbion they would not

work until Piiel was returned to the plant. A grievance meeting was held. Th
men were told that the grievances would be aired as soon as poe Sible.
was rettlrned. to work.

The men charged all the furnaces except No. 41.

Piiel
Ma..

na.gement informed the workers it wanted. all the furn&ces, including No. 41
furnace operating. Since no aareement was reached, all the fu.rnaces in. No.3
Open Hearth were tapped and let to cool. .An. orderly sb.utd.own was effeetuated
In the mea.ntime, dissatllfa.ction spread to the worker _ at Nos. 1 and Z

Open Hearths.
for 30 days.

Mal was discbaraed..

The Unian held. that

u

With further talks, he was su.pead.ed.

was insubordiDAte, but that m.ana.gement

made him a sc:a.pe .. goat for the aflair which was out 01. hil centro! since be did.
uot attent the meetinl at which the men decided not to char •• No. 41 furnace.
They a.rgued that he should 1M reinstated without penalty.

They likewise char-

ged that tile me. tUd. !lOt pull a wildcat strike. rather management had shut
flew. the No.3 Open Hearth.
Decision: Ralph T. Sewud. permanent arbitra.tor under the agreement
rulecl that ill Article

xvm.

the partie. bAd a,reed tha.t management may sus-

pent! and later discharge aay employee who violated its provisions. On the
evidence before him, the Um.pire said h_ had no choice but to find that when
Pli.l refus..o. to char._ the No.41 furnace, he enlalad in an action which inter
rupee! or interferred with work 01" prod.uetiea, within the meaning of the Articl
and was subject to disehar.e.

That other employee. may abo have been gull
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cannot excuse his OVIn violation.

No basis was found for setting aside or modi

fying the 30-day suspension imposed upon Piiel in lieu of discharge and therefore the grievance was denied.

D.

FINAL SETTLEMENT ON THE WORK RULES ISSUE:

As part of the October 1. 1959. offer to increase wages and benefits
the compaaies called upon the Union to join in making mutually satisfactory
ameAdmeats to the agreement in four lenera! areas: 53
1) To in.corporate the 17¢ per hour cost-of-livin.g adjustment which the
workers had now received under the provisions of the 1956 agreement.

How-

ever. management insisted that provision. for future changes either up or down
be eliminated.
%) Management also insisted on the right to take reasonable steps to

combat inefficiency through revision of the work practices clause.

The em-

ployees were guaranteed the right to resort to grievance and arbitration procedures.

Under this formula, management would be required to justify the

reasonablene •• of its action.
3) The Union was ..sked to allow management felxibility in scheduling
of work to conform with the requirements of bualne88.

53. Tom Campbell. "The Main Points of Steel's Offer,
October I, 1(59), p. 15%.

If

Iron Age,
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4) The final amendment was to deter wildca.t strikes by permittin.g the
discharge of any employee engaged in such action.

In addition to the respensi-

bility on the part of the individual workers, the companies insisted on c:1arii}ing the responsibility of local unions in respect to wildcat strikes occuring
within their jurisdiction.
In the November 15, 1959, companies' "Last OUer, " as a solution to

the local working conditions dispute the companies offered to accept the Union'
proposal for a joint study committee.

But if that step did not result in a mutu

ally satisfactory solution by June 30, 1960, the issue would be turned over to
binding arbitration.

54 Of. the contract chan,ges originally proposed by the

companies, only those relating to local working conditions, wildcat strikes,
and scheduling bad been retained.

This was much the same as had been pro-

posed by the negotiators in the proposals annoWlced in early October.

In the final agreement incorporated into the master contract. the parties agreed to retain the local working conditions clauses of the old contract
with the follOWing additions: 55

1) The settlement of a grievance prior to

arbitration under the proviSions of the agreement would not constitute a precedent in the settlement of grievances in other situations.

2) The parties, as

a matter of policy, would encourage the prompt settlement of problems at the

54. "Companies' .Latest 2-B Offer,

11

Iron Age, (November 26, 1959),

p. 53.
55. US W" f Steel Labor.. (F e bruar y, 1960), p. .
9
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local level.

3) The parties established a Joint ComrnHtee headed by a 11eutral

chairman to study the local working conditioi'lS and th-eir appHcation and make
recornmendations to the parties "for such action as the parties may mutually
agree upon" by November 30, 1960.
The agreement also established a Human Relations Committee of the
industry, the Union. and the

p\"~blic

to make long-ran,ga studies.

Through the

studies and work of the conumtte<3. which might have been patterned after the

Industry Council Plan. the Union hoped to achieve its goal .. -"Tba.t goal is a
strike-free industry." 56

56. Ibi!., p. Z.

CHAPTER
ANALYSIS

AND

IV

CONCLUSIONS

In the foregoing description of the contending views of management and

labor in the steel controversy, which presented both the basic rationale and
details of their arguments, the writer has reserved analysis of their conflicting views.

A.

This analysis is formulated in the present chapter.

ANALYSIS OF THE WAGE ISSUE:
Recession cut-backs in st.el production caused either direct lay-offs

for many steelworkers or reduction in their hours worked.

These downward

adjustments in wages cau.K earnings to fall below expected yearly increases.
As a result, the earnings of .teelworkers in 1958, despite wage increases in
mid-1958, fell below earnings in 1951.

Hence, to insure a level of earnings

in 1959 which would eradicate some of the shortcomings in 1958, the Union
was forc.d to demand a substantial wage increase.
The Union made extensive use of both the Heller and City Family budgets to prove its point that a wage increase, based on 1958 earnings, was
needed.

However, certain biases are inherent in the use of annual earnings.

The arlJUment was pressed that the annual earaings of all steelworkers had
been considerably lower.

However, the assumption was made in the presen-

tation of these facts that each one of the steelworkers was responsible for the

105

total requirements of the budget for a family of the same size- -four.
facts however. have not shown this to be true.

The

The Mitchell Report stated

that the number of dependents claimed by steelworkers in 1958 averaged
Z. 1.

1

For a meaningful comparison. then, a new approach in compiling data

for evaluating earDinls and family budlet is needed.
The Union arlued that a freeze on wale. until mid-l 960, as sUlgested
by management in its initial proposal, would put the workers behind increases

gained by other workers.

In the final res.lve of the controversy, however,

the Union accepted a no-wale iacrease until December I, 1960.
might seem to indicate a reversal of what the UDion demanded.

To some this
However,

when placed into perspective, there was an actual increase in take-home pay
through the 6. 5¢ absorption of insurance and. peDsion costs by the companies.
That wages do influence prices and vice versa is a fact that has been
taken for Iranted.
position.

However an analysis of their influence is not a simple pro-

Wages depend on the relationship of other factor coste, the effieienc

of operation, and so on.

So too. even though wages come out of current production and not profits, it is commonplace that bigh profits invite the attention of Unions.

The

$694 million profits of the steel i_ustry in the first half of 1959 was used by
the Union in wage increase demands.

This means that 80me of the gain might

1. U.S. Department of Labor, Background Statistics, Section 3.
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be absorbed by higher labor costs.

In ordinary bu8iness calculations wage-

cost increases a.re regarded a8 irreversible. unless they are offset by Inore
efficient operations.
The management argument that there was no need for an increase in
steelworkers' wages because they were already ahead of most workers. taken
at face value as it was presented in the controversy, seems to the writer to be
irreleva.nt.

When viewing wages paid to worker a the fact must net be over-

loeked that the demand for wGrkers and the supply of workers with the skills
and training needed are determining iactors in what wage scales will be paid
fer specific occupations.

The Mitchell Report ca.utioned that average earn-

ings for an entire industry are influenced by the proportion of workers at
various skill levels and that this proportion varies widely among industries.
"Ba8ic steel employs a relatively large proportien of workers in skilled. occupations. ,,2 Sueh comparisons between the various rates paid workers having
the same job titles must be interpreted with caution because of differences in
jeb content and working conditions even fer the same job title in different industries.
An increase in akills and respensibilities of workers in stefll can also
be viewed in terms o! capital investment per production worker, which has
continued t. climb in the industry in recent years, from about $9.000 in 1947

2. Ibid.. Section S.

107
to

about $ZO, 000 in 1957.

3

Thus it has

mor~

than doubled in a decade.

In the argun1Emts over the hou.rly wa.ge the writer feels that the Union
failed to point out that such payment$ are m.eaningles. in themselves.

In

addition to vievving hourly wages, take-home pay mU8t be considered.

The

Union research department failed to expose the fact that payroll deductions ... -

income tax,

~tate

grosA taxell, Social Security.

iD~uranee,

hospitalization a.nd

a.ccident, and pensil)n premiun-,s - -take a considera.ble amount from the wcrkers' earnings.

These must be cenflidered £.1' meaningful analysis and for

placing wage$ in eorrect perspective.

1.

~

Money Wage Settlement:

The final wage settlement which

was daimed as a union vic::tory also provided for some gains for the eteel industry. The a.greement provided that wages would not be direetly increased un

til December I, 1960, and again on October 1 f 1 '161.

Then too, there were

limitations set on the practice of tying wages on eosts-of-1iving even to the
point that some benefits which might result from increases in the Index could
be applied to insurance costs if theee proved to be greater than expected.
final settlement avoided any retroactivity to the workers dating back to the
expiration of the old agreement in June, 1959.

3.

Ibid., Section 2.

The

•

\

,I
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Mr. McDonald told the W PC delegates how he felt after signing the
new agreement.

He stated 4 that the Steelworkers had remained united and

strong throughout the 116 days of sacrifice and privation and that the contract
just Signed was the "greatest and the finest labor contract in the history of
steel."

He pointed out that one of the long-range goala--dating back to the

founding of the United Steelworkers .... ha.d. been a non-contributory insurance
for its membership.
The settlement established in the basic steel industry. and for the first
time in any American industry, that every Steelworker retiring on penSion
would receive a special retirement payment equal to 13 weeks' vacation pay,
including any vacation he might have corning for that year.

This meant that

every Steelworker, when he retires, will receive about $1,500 in cash and a
substantially-improved, 8On-contributory monthly pension for the rest of hi.
life in addition to Social Security.
The Union tried to impress this fact upon a doubting public.
To those sceptics who traditio:na1ly point out how much
wages are lost when workers are forced to strike, we now wish
to point out that this payment, which is in the bank for every
Steelworker. alone substantially makes up for all the wages
lost during our long struggle without considering all of the
other economic improvements. 5

4. "Strike-Free Industry." ~ Labor, (February. 1960), p. Z.
5. ''Wage Policy Group Praises Rank and File Courage, Unity," Ibid.,

p. 4.

109
2. Equating Productivity:

Today we hear a lot about the benefits of

and the equating of a bigher standard of living with an increase in productivity.
It i8 a paradex of the times that just when advancing technQlogy holds

out new prospects for rising incomes and greater leisure for an increasing
number of workers that the different:es between union and management ever
the productivity increases took on the appearance of a power struggle.

Un-

questionably, there is room for both ste.l management and ateellabor to hold
difference. of opinien on the concept of productivity.
However, to include all the requirements su,geated by management
(viz., total costs in the productive process regardless of whether direct, indirect, or non ... direct) would cause any attempts at measuring productivity to
meet with failure.

More than that,

DAD

statistical form.ula or index has been

devised to weight the relative importance of su.ch items in a productivity mix
adequately.
When the simple labor productivity index is used, the implication
should be there·"'(anci it sometimes ia, but usually stated as an after-thought)
--that the particular index is not to be taken as a measure of labor t 8 contribu ...
tion to total output, rather, it is a measure of the effectiveness with which
labor requirements are combined with other inputa not represented in the
index.

Su.apicion and indecision will always remain as to how much of the

increase in productivity has been due to labor's effens rather than to other
factors.
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Since the time has not yet arrived from a conceptual, data coliection,
or computation standpoint, according to Mr. Cla.gue, 6 for the inclusien of all
factors of productivity, it is senselesl to argue that they must 'be included
without doing something about it.

Then too, the use of man-hours require-

ments a.s a sole indicator of productivity will never do.

For either side to

press its views on wages in collective bargaining negotiations baaed upon present productivity statistics or "pon the need to include other ia.ctors will accomplish no further purpose tl1&n widening their differences and fanning their
emotions.
In this regard the statistics devised by management in the comparison

'betw-een increases in Steelworkers' wages
ments

f~Oo/c)

over the past 20 years failtKi.

on the basis of steel shipments.

(~8a%)

and increases in steel ship-

'l'he steel industry does not operat

Within the fra.mework of production planning

procedures, decisions are based primarily upon curren.t and prospective or-

ders.

To these are added allowances to cover rejections and scrap losses.

In some mills these allowa.nces account for between 10 and

ao% (depending

UPO!

the specific product) additional production, some of which never goes to customers, but £lows back into the production of new steel.

6. ChicaS. Tribune, (May Z7, 1959). F, Part 5, p. 7.
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3. Inflation--"Cost Push" or "Demand PullU? In view of the voiced
concern of the steel industry spokesmen for the American public and their
self-appointed rrussion to inform the public of the evils of inflation, the steel
industry leaders had themselves become sensitive to the reaction of the public
and the displeasure of the goverlll"l'lent.

The Administered Price Hearings in

Washington. condu.cted by the Senate Subconurdttee under Senator Kefauver,

were particularly distasteful to industry leaders.

The problel'n of inflation is one about which the
can be aroused.

Anl~rican

public I sire

Ol1ce the pocket book is affected, the anger mounts.

i8 vitally needed is a sane approach to wage and price determination.

What
Th.e

steel problertl was a.ccentuated by the fact that no detailed a.nalysis has yet
been made of the real and exact i:nfllJ.enees: of wages and prices in any given
industry as these influences spread or are carried out through the entire eeo-

nonlY·
The infla.tionary spiral, even with pushes from costs increa.ses. must
be considered a demand spiral on the basis that there mUF.t be suificient demand to take higher-priced goods off the market.

In so dohlg, the process is

kept moving upward.
Some economists doubted the validity of singling ou.t either la.bor or industry, or the two jointly, as responsible for inflation.
that either is capable of curing it.

They doubted further

Ho-'Never, 3ach of the parties in the steel

controversy tried to evaluate its pOSition in collective barga.ining to see
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whether or not something could be dGne to prove that it was not responsible for
the ilUlation.

4. For.lsn CompetitionuA New Market Mec:hanisrn:

One of the main

features of the free-enterprise capitalistic: system is the factor of competition.
In fact, competitive forces are looked upon as the life-blood of the system.

It

is through them that the free market is protec:ted..

Competition results in the substitution of other products and services
for those previously demanded.

Steel has replac:ed many materials in pro ..

ducts.
Many indWJtries have felt the decline of their markets as competition
has resulted in the substitution of other product. for theirs.
can be cited as an example.

The coal industr

Where for many year s coal was used as the basic

fuel not only for home but also industrial and commercial consumption, the
coal industry had competition from the products of oU, gas, and even oxygen,
and now, nuculear power.

The replacement of steel products over the years bas not been a major
problem.

Ingot capacity sinee 1950 has continued to grow from about 90 mil-

lion ingot tons to 140 million ingot tons in 1959.

Efforts to replace steel auto-

mobile bodies with fiber glass have proved to be both costly and unsatisfactor
Even attempts by the plastics industry to invade the domain of Keel in other
products bas not proved effective, save in the area of tubing and some panelin
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Hence, little importance is placed on the possibility of mass replacement of
steel in industry, at least for the present.
Shifts to other producers in foreign markets is looked upon, however,
as a much more formidable threat.

The American Steel Industry expressed

much concern that looming over the horizon is a new threat- -that of foreign
steel penetration of the American market.

The rebuilt European and Japanese

mills are considered a defbdte concern to the American Steel Industry.
Hewever, the validity of statistical data employed in presenting this
part of the issue is questionable.

True, the statistics showed the disparity

between foreign. steel imports and domestic exports.

The context of. the times

in preparation for a possible strike and in hedging in anticipation for a possiblt

strike, the writer believes, caused even further accentuation of the disparity
between imports aDd exports than might have oc:cured had times been dUferent.

B. INDUSTRY GIVES UNION "POPULAR fI ASSISTANCE:

The Union denounced the Eight PoiAt Proposal suggested by the industry as a step toward. the restoration of ''industrial dictatorship" and the wiping
out of gains won by the Steelworkers over a

20 year period.

The result was a

unification of the rank-and-flle behind its leaders such as had not existed when
the sole question was whether they should strike for more money. 7

7. A. H. Raskin, "The Rout of Big Steel,
6, 1960), p. 43.
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observers claimed that the steel negetiators handed McDonald a gold.plated as
slst when the program was brought to the bargaining table.
steel officials as well as u:aion people.

"This comes from

The argument is that the rank and fUe

feeling, which has wa-vered from Mr. McDonald is new against the companies.

tI

8
The Union as early as July had publicly admitted that the "Eight Point

Proposal lf had helpeti to weld the Steelworkers into a united front and. permitted
no backward step.
When the corpora.tion openly revealed hOW' they hoped to
wreck the union a.s well as job rights of the individuals, this was
the impetus needed- -if one were needed indeed- -which teuched
off a positive, constru.ctive ba.ttle against return to the dark ages
of company Ullioaisme 9
It's ironic that the wark rules or local working conditions under attack
by the indu.stry were largely established by the companies in line with their

own ata.Ddards, not the Union'a.

The contract (Section Z-B .. l) prohibited the

.atabliahment of a working condition by employe.a.

In addition, the Steel-

werkera' Union wasn't pewerful enough to dictate working rules two decades
ago when it first began to represent the workers.

8. Tom Campbell, "Talks Break Off; Itt s Up to Ike.
(October 1, 1959), p. 44.

9. US W, ~ Labor, (July. 1959), p. Z.
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Dt'. Taylol', after listening to the a.rguments from both

Ul'..iOl1.

and ma.na ..

gennent officia.ls. concluded that. if the bstimony presented were correct, the
companies had a rather \V'ide latitude in introducin.g technological change6 and
adjusting manpov.'el

<

This

~ituation.

he thought. many other in.du$tries would

give a great deal to have. 10
An analyeb of the united front of the steel industry ill the work rules

issue has presented as. major problem to the writer.

A dilew..ma waH crea.ted

in the author's mind over the exercise of ,ecial responsibilities by the individual leaders of the industry <In

t.~e

work rules isaue.

-W"hile the author agrees

with steel ma.na.lement that the negotiations arrangements with the four man
bargaining team were effective in balancing the solidarity of the Steelworkers,
he cannot comprehend the position of thoee leadero whe continued in the arrangement once the wa.ge issue was relegated to a :Jeeondary position in agl°e.emen:

negotiations.

Especially incomprehensible wa.s the avoidance of the exercise

of social responsibility .f tho•• producers who were not involved in the "Z-B"
controversy because the a.greements they had signed in 1956 did not include
the controversial 2-B cla.uses.
The question arises: Why did the companies insist that changes in work
rulee were necessary a.s a. precondition for talk. on wage increases?

The

writer believes that the steel companies had two reasons for seeking m.ore

10. New ~ Times, (October IS, 1959), Part 4, Section E,

p. 1.
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flexibility: 1) the pace of technol¢g!.cal adV3nc~ in the ateel industry had been
mounting and was bound to forge ahead at an even greater rat., and l) that,

if wage increases "vere denied, the workers weuld seek outlets in . . vork rules,
There is 1.'11::::.-- doubt in the writer's mind on the exercise of SGcia,l re·

I>ponsibility by the Union over the work rules issue. The negative stand of the
Union rega.rding changes in werk rules and. the problems affecting the steel indur.try prevented ne2otiations from arriving at their logical conclusion, namel
.An eady settlement.

"[hile the writer realizes that the Union was caught off

guard and felt it was hit "below the belt" by the industry proposals, he doee
not thirut that the Union fought back '.vith positive punches.

in the rlng by dodging.

It kept its position

In deing eo, its objective to get the Steelworkers back

to work was delayed until the fifteenth round.

1. Mana.,ement Rights--Provided Agreements ~ Not Invalidate Them:
The writer can sympathize with the management contention that often times
changes in operations could result in more efficient operations and savings of
large sums of money if it had a. free hand in directing operations.

This is es

sentially the argument advancecl by management in four eases cited under
"Decisions Regard.ing Local Conditions and Past Pre.etices." In Z6 LA 160
(pp. 71-72) management considered the workers skilled and capable of performing the duties of inspection of their own work.

However, when first aS8ignin

them, management placed inexperieneed workers as welders.

Case Z, 27 LA

U.,
26Z (pp. 12· 73) again shm-ved the fai.1Ul'e of management to consider seriouf:ly
when mAlting cllanges in the nature of work and tools used in performing it.
The arl1.lmel'ltf advanced by l"l'..anaienlelu in. Zl LA 283 (pp_ 74: .. 75) have

~ee!l

typical. -Readjusttn-::n.tG in the '_vork terce during ,la.ck periods call rot' detailed
pla.1WUi and knowledie a!. the &areem.ent.

The statement th&t lay-oUs w.uld

have cteeurred in L'1.y event even if the CO!Up&ny had not reassigned jobs holds
no w@ipt.

...."-laL'1, 31 LA. 466 (pp. 1.5 .. 76) shows that where contractu.a.l a.gree-

ments stipw.a.tod the procedues for job combination, the parties 'J'/6re .bUaa ..

ted to confer a.ud. mutua.lly &iree upen a dicposition.
All Gf theso pro'blern.E could.

h&v~

be ... 1.'flul'lCdied, evlUl before they oc-

curred, by n;JoOre astuto plamung of the original operatione and :.rnore attention
tel tra.i:lU.na in procedures .1. the operatiC)ns.

To uealect these because of the

determlnatio:u to hurriedly ma.xw.fa.cture .. product can cost the

maD&s.m~nt

fa ... m4re thaa the profit received trom the opera.tion.
Thare is .vidence to sUPPOl't the Vllf.cm view that when chan,es in. tech ..
. .lelY were made. the grievances were deme4 by arbitrators. In Z4 LA 336
(pp. 77 ..78) tali :management deciaioa to cha:a.e Mth the equipment (replacing

steam esa.gln.es with dt •••l1eccxaotives' and the crew sise wa. upheld. Another

grievance, as LA 164 (pp. 78 ... 19). was lost by the Unien who contended that
the company violated. the aireemont provision that existina job cIa.sUiea.U....

ceu1cl aet be

eMn,_

except by matul alro4h'J.'1e1lt whe. the maulemeat rMuc-

eel the work ferce after the inst&lla.Uea of a trGllIh. clisplacemel1t mec:lt&nism.
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The Union likewise failed to receive a favorable decision in 26 LA 146 (pp. 7980).

The arbitrator upheld management's right to eliminate jobs because of

technolGgical improvements in mill practices.
Where the contract bad not placed limitations upon management decisions for change, the arbitrator's reward upheld management rights.

The deci-

sion in 26 LA 325 (p. 80) upheld the full authority of management to change
job content where the agreement had. not prohibited its action.
The decision rendered in Z2 LA 580 (p. 81) upheld management in determining crew size and the disposition of "excess" work force, since nothing
in the contract agreement required it to make vacancies or to alsign more
workers than the minimum required.
In US W v. Warrior and Navigation, No. Z2,l, (pp. 82, .. 83) the arbitra-

tor's decision upheld management's right to subcontract even though the work
could have been performed and in fact had. been performed by its own employees.

The reward was based upon the Management clause which rendered the

decisions of management absolute in directing the working forces even to the
extent of laying off workers aDd subcontracting the work.
In the tw. remaining case. on local conditi.ns and past practice. which

the Union felt violated. the provisions of the local agr.ement. the one (31 LA
754, pp. 73-74) was sustained and. the other (28 LA 651, pp. 76-77) was denied
The decisions, however. were based upon the safety and health clauses and
not specifically on management'. rights, local conditions. or past practice s.
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even though the parties had argued their positions along these lines.
2. Scheduling

~

Hours

2! Work:

Two eases (31 LA 668, pp. 87-88

and 31 LA 855, pp. 89 .. 90) were won by the Union because specific or tacit
agreements were entered into by management and the employees regulating
the share.the-work .. programs.

The arbitrators in both cases recognized the

employees' grievancea only to the extent that management had previously recogmlled. certain employees t rights as superior to those of other employees.
In 19 LA 379 (p. 90) management's right to .ehedule all employees on

a 32-hour or more a week basis was v.pheld because management's right to do
so had not been surrendered by preYious agreements.

The two remaining

cases (30 LA 395, p. 91 and 31 LA 217, p. 92) upheld management's exclusive
right to schedule hoUl's of work to comply with slack period. of production.
Thus the scheduling of hours ef work as viewed from these decisions
was not a ''hide-and-seek lf game 'but based upon either written or oral alreements e.tablilhed. at the discretion of tDdWltrial maugement.
The maDagement argument that it was I1paying for work not dene" falls
under its own weight.

The writer had been in the employ of a major .teel pro

ducal' for six year s in the Order and Scheduling Department.

Based upon his

years of experieDCe in scheduling production, he concludes that if management
did ''pay for work not done" it was because of either managerial or clerical
miscalculations.

If such were the ease, the need was not for changes in
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contractual clauses but in organization.

3. Manasement Prerogatives

~

Dealing

~

Wildcat Strikes:

The

writer is at a complete loss in evaluating management's insiaUDce on changes
in agreement provisions dealing with wildcat strikes.

Even in the limited.

study of cases, lie finds a.ll the decisions favorable to management.

Thus in

41 LRRM 1329 (pp. 97-98), the General Counsel ruled that the erAployer wa.s
within his rights to discharge union officials who, in violation of the contract,
called a wildcat.

Furthermore, the Counsel upheld the company's right to

reinstate the officials except those who were guilty of picket line misconduct.
Gase 42 LRRM 1335 (pp. 98-99) also upheld the discharge of union officials
who instigated a walkout in violation of a "No Strike" agreement, even though
others had participated and escaped diSCipline.
28 LA 638 (pp. 99-101) is most interesting because the decision upheld
the mitigated discipline of the employee as imposed by the company.

The ar-

bitrator totally disregarded the contention of the Union that other participants
were not disciplined.
viotation.

This decision rendered each emplCYyee guilty of his own

Thus management had guarantees that the revisions they were

seeking in the new agreement were unnecessary because arbitrators laJ.d al ..
ready rendered decisions which could be used as guideposts in deaUng with
wildcat strike••
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The wdter fe31s manage.rnellt's insistan.ce on tightening penalties for
wildcat strikers was a logical demand only if management won the battle direc
ting changes in werk rulee.

Wildcat .trike situations under the old agreement

were often outgrowths of management changes in working conditions which the
employees felt were not justified.

The inability of the companies in handling

such situations would have mounted to disasterous proportions if the reins on
wildcat strikes were not inclusively restricted a.nd. management figured that a

new agreement changing work rules would have invited an even greater occuranee of wildcat strikes.

If the data on wildcat strikes under the 1956 agreement (p. 93) a.s submitted by management is factual, the writer f.els that the matter was being
baDdled more effectively as the parties ac:e1bnated themselves to the agreement.

Thus in 1956, the industry was threatened by 335 work stoppages re ..

sulting in the 1••• of 213,900 tons of metal.

Yet by 1958, the number of wild-

cat strike. was reduced to 148 and lost tonnages to 146,600 tons.
The new labor agreement assured no major disruption of production
for a two and a half year period instead of the 2.0 months the Union originally
.ought after the agreement with Kaiser Steel in late October, 1959.

4.

~

Settlement 2.:: "York Rules: The outcome made it plain that

the industry had tried to accomplish too much too quickly and in the process
had almost suffered total defeat.

In its plea. to the American public the
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indu~try

had c"unteci on support for its stand.

C:OllSpic:UOUS

However, the inclustry's most

taetical n:dsealculation was in the encydopedic covera.ge of the

IIJ;ight Point Proposal" it had advocated for eJ1d.ing manpower waste and. cutting

employment c:osts. Even the

scal~ .. down

program on work rules. scheduling,

and wildcat strikes intensified the unification of the rank-and-rUe behind the

Union leader s.
In ovaluat1ng the effect of the settlement, Mr. Roger M. Blough said

they could not 'be thought of merely in terms ef ciollars, maehines, markets,
and prafit•• ner in such abstract e£onomie coneepts as inflation. pvchasing
power. and prMuctivity.

He concluded that they are meaningful ODly when

"expres.ed ill terms of people .. -thelr hope" their ••piration8, their job .ecu.-

rity. and the welfare ef their famille ••

ff

11

11. "Blough's Remarks on Steel Agreement.
nuary 5, 19(0). p. 18.

fI

~.!!!! Times, (Ja. ..

123
APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF
1959 S I'EEL CONTROVERSY

April 10..

lD4ustry proposes one year contract "fr.e.e rt which would preser ...
ve 1 T~ cost-of...Uvin, adjustments WOJ1. in 1956 contract 'but proposed
DO further automatic advances.

April 13..

UDioa rejects proposal hut BUIgests that aegotiatioJ1.s get under way
as seon as possible.

May 5 -

Negotiations open in New York City with United. States Steel Corporatioa. Others follow.

June 10..

but.stry propeses HEight Point Proposal" contract changes .s pre ..
coDditlou fer M,otlations on wa,es.

a5...

Uaited Steelworkers of America asks PreSident Dwight D. Eisenhower to appoint a Board te determiae facts regarding wages, prices
and productivity. The request ,. declined when industry would not
go alon, with the proposal.

June

JW'l8 30..

DeadliD.e of 1956 contract is extended. to July 15 at the request ctf
Pr.sldent Eisenhower.

July 1 ..

Wildcat atl'ik•• break out in lake shipping and in steel plants.
David J. McDoDald orders men back to work. Negotiations Buspende4 Wlt1l wildcat strikes oDd.

July' ..

Ne,etia.ttoas resume iD New York City.

July 8 ..

Pl"e.ident Elseahower re....s pl_ tl1a.t both sides continue negotiations t. lind a reasonable answer and that operations continue
durial Mlotiatlons.

July 11 -

Indutry negotiators oller Union and iaclefiDite contract extension
subject to termination on 10 days' DGtice from either party; Union
rejects proposal.

1Z4

Companies willing to negotiate insurance and pension benefits
during first year of a Z -year contract and a modeat wage increase
in the second year provided the Union agree to contract provisions
enabling the companies to generate economic progress in their operations sufficient to offset the costs of employment increases.
July 1 Z -

Union suggests formation of a Joint committee to study local practices during the terms of a new agreement; Companies remain
steadfast in d.exnands that changes in local working conditions are
essential to a non ..inf1ationary wage agreement.

July 13 -

McDonald. meets with Wage Policy Committee and. US W I nternational Executive Board. Union asks for 15~ bourly package increas
for each year of a one-, two"', or three-year contract.

July 15..

At 1 z.: 0 1 a. m., the new deadline pas se. without agreement and the
sixth Nationwide steel strike siaee World War II begins.

July ZO..

Federal Mediator Joseph F. Finnegan meets with both sides in
New York 'but describee situation as very serious and not susceptible t. an easy or early solutien.

July ZZ..

Labor Secretary James P. Mitchell named by the President to begin fact-finding probe.

July Z7 -

UnfOD. aDd Company negotiators held first joint meeting since
strike began along with Federal Mediator Finnegan who reports
there was no substantial change of position by either party in any
respect.

August 1 - Labor Secretary Mitchell asks both sides to get down to serious
collective bargaining and meet together daily to reach a settlement.
August 5 - After two joint meetings, Feder&! Mediator Finnegan says there
ia still no change of position by either party.
August 7 - McDonald leaves New York meetings and begins tGur of district
picket line ••
Auguat 17 .. First study made by Department of Labor on unempl_yment impac
of strike in 31 major ete.l ..producing and ateel-consuming areas
releaa.a that the strike is having only limited secondary effects.

~
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August 19 ... Mitchell releases Backsround Statistics Bearing ~!!! ~~
pute. Both Union a.nd Industry negotiators assert the report justifies their views.
August lO - Joint meetings of top fOUl' steel industry negotiators: R. Conrad
Cooper. R. Heath Larry, Harold C. Lumb, and John H. Morse,
and Union negotiators: David J. McDonald, Howard R. :Hague, 1. W.
Abel, and Arthur J. Goldberg resume in New York. David McDonald and R. Conrad Cooper are present for first time since August

7.
August 13 - President again states he has no plans for government interventien unless the strike develops into a threat t. the National security.
August 17 - Talk. rece •• until September Z.
September 1 .. Contract negotiations resume but the follOWing day are reees"
sed to September 8.
September 8 .. President Eisenhower sends letters to both sides asking that
they 'begin intensive and uninterrupted good-faith 'barga.ining.
September 9 ... US W ealls for face-to-lace negotiations between Union and
chief executives of 12 major steel companies in an effort to settle
the strike, but executives reply that the four man bargaining team
fully represents them.
September Z5 - Stalemate negotiations cause a complete break .. off of talks and
McDonald directs the Union headquarters to be closed in New York.
September Z8 ... President summons industry and Union leaders to separate
White House meetings to be held Wednesday morning. September 30
in an effort to end the 76-day strike.
September 30 - Both sides agree lUlder the President's urgings to resume con
tract negotiations. McDonald and Arthur J. Goldberg, General
Counsel of the Union
to the hotel suite of Ro,er M. Blough,
Boa.rd Chairman of US Steel Corporation to begi:l talk3.

,0

Top executives of five leading steel companies are also present.
This was the first time they had met with Union officials since the
strike began.
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October 1 .. Negotiaticnl9 shift to the Penn-Sheraton Hotel in Pittsburgh. Companies submit a new proposa.l to the Union.
October 4 - McDonald forewards rejection of the compa1rles I ofler by the US W
Executive Board a'" "totally ur...acceptable." Union requests to
meet with top executives of 12 steel companies is rejected by Coope •
October 9 - Preddent cOllfers with four cabinet n1embers and takes first steps
in. invo1rJ.ng the TaIt-Hartley Act by appointing a l;oa.l'd of Inquiry.
Members of the Board include: George W. Taylor, Chairman, profe ••or of Industry at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; John Perkins, president of the University ol Delaware; and
Paul N. Lehoczky. professor of Industrial Engineering, Ohio State
University.
October 12 - 13 ... Union presents its case to fact-finders.
Oetober 14 - 1 is ... Steel industry appear 8 before the Board of Inquiry.
October 1 (, - US W offers a new peace proposal calling fer a package increase
0{ ~l. 5¢ an h"ur over a. toNO year period plus limited cest-of .. U,r!ng
increases. Industry estimates the cost at 33~ over .. 20"'month
period and rejects the Union offer.
October 17 .. The Companies submit a counterproposal for a 3-yeal' agreement
with imprevements in pen.i.n and insurance the first year and a
wage increase in eac:h succe.ding year. Union rejects offer.
October 18 - Talks c:ollapse in Washington.
October 19 - Oeorge W. Taylor, fact-finding Beard chairman, announces negettations bad broken dewn and the Board despaired of a settlement.
The report, originally set for October 16, but delayed until today
in an effort to reach a settlement, is presented te the President.
October ZO - Federal Judge Herber P. Sorg of Pittsburgh grants the injunction requested by the government. An hour later. the Union files
an appeal in the US Third District Court of Al'~a.h in Philadelphia
opposing the injWletion.
Judge. Austin Staely grants an immediate
heal'ing.
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October 2Z .. Circuit Court, Philadelphia, hears US W arguments which claim
no National emergency exists which would endanger the Nation's
health and safety. Decision grants further stay pending appeal to
the United States Supreme Court.
October Z6 - Individual company negotiation meetings resume with local bargaining representatives. Kaiser Steel Corporation and the United
Steelworkers of America announce they signed a new contract agree·
ment.
OctoDer 27 .. US Third Dbtrlct court of Appeals upholds the strike injunction,
Dut delays compliance for six days to give United Steelworkers time
to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Detroit Steel signs
contract.
October 29 .. Top bargaiDing resumes in Pittsburgh.

No progress reported.

October 30 .. Granite City Steel signs agreement.
October 31 .. Top bargai:ning talks collapse.
November 2 ... Industry and Union negotiators hold separate conferences with
Finnegan in Wasb.inaton.
November 3 .. Supreme Court hearings open. Decision delayed pending study
.t. pertinent fact. by both the U S W and the government.
November 7 .. US Supreme Court, by an 8-1 d.ecision, u.pholcls the Taft-Hart ..
ley injunction directing the Steelworkers back to work for an ao . . day
peried. McDonald itays they will comply with the law and return
to their normal employment in compliance with the injunction.
November 8 .. 9 .. Plants beain to produce iron and steel for the first time in
four menths.
November 17 .. Companie. make "Last Offer II which they estbnate would raise
employment costs to about 30~ an hour in .. new 3 -year contract.
The 17~ p$1" hour cost-of .. living increases granted under the 1956
agreement would. continue 1N.t provisions would prevent further
increalles.
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Certain Union suggestions to strengthen seniority provisions would
be incorpora.ted.
The companies propose to remove from the area
of conflict the controversial "\"'fork rules If provision of the C01'ltract
by b:loadening the terms of arbitration.
November 19 - Union rejects industry's new propoaal.
December 8 .. US W and two major can producing firms - -Continental Can Com
pany and American Can Company ... -agree on a new contract. Campa
Dies say it adds u.p to 28. Zf per hour ever 3 years with probability
of cost-of-living to add. soft'l.e 6~ mOre. The pact includes 1m.prove ...
menta in insurance and. pensions aDd other benefits.
DecemDer 10 .. Mediation session suspended to permit McDonald and other
Union officials to participate in Aluminum Industry contract negotiatiOllS in Chicago.
December 19 .. Five aluminum !irms--Al:wninum Company of America (ALCO.A)
R.ynolds Metal Company, Kaleel' Aluminum and Chemical Corporation: Ormet Corporation, and Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation
.... sign new labor agreement.
New agreements on a '-year contract provide a 30¢ package increase. Included are cost-m-living and retroactivity on wage. and
benefits back to August 1, 1959, in accor<ianc:e with extension a.gree·
ment ••
Dec.mber Z3 .. US W says private postcard poll, based upon more than ZOO, 00
reply., shows members opposed to industry's "Last Offer" by a
marlin of 950/0.
December 14 - US W seeks US District Court at Pittsburgh order to force
firm.s to pay 4¢ hourly cost-ot .. Uving wage increase. The action
tak.n 'by General Counsel Arthllr J. Cioldber, was baled on specifications of the Taft- Hartley injunction. Steel firms contend that
the eost-of-living provision was not one of the terms and conditions
which should be applicable during the IO ..day injunction period.
December 13 ... President's Steel Inquiry Board resume. sessions but reports
no progr ••••
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December 31- Vice President Richard ~.,1. Nixon and Secretary of abor James
P. ~,Ititchel1 ::neet with leader II en both sides in !teel dispute urging
e.. rly settlel"nent.
January 4 - Settlement reached after all-night n.gotiations •••• ion in Washington..
January 5 - Uiuon's Wage Policy Committee accepts new master agreement.
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